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Rhode Island's Access to Public
Records Act: An Application Gone
Awry
Michael W. Field*
A popular Government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Trag-
edy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern igno-
rance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors,
must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives. I
- James Madison
INTRODUCTION
There is little doubt the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution 2 and Article 1, Section 21 of the Rhode Island Consti-
tution3 both embrace a citizen's right to access documents concern-
* B.S., Ithaca College (1993); J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law
(1997). Since April 1999, Michael W. Field has been a Special Assistant Attorney
General assigned to investigate and enforce Rhode Island's Access to Public
Records Act. All Department of Attorney General related material referenced rep-
resents documents publicly available prior to the commencement of work on this
Article. I express my deepest appreciation to Douglas Emanuel, Debra Cohen,
Leon Field, and James Baum for their thoughtful and critical comments. The
opinions expressed in this Article are my own and should in no way be imputed to
the Department of Attorney General.
1. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRIT-
INGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
3. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 21 ("The citizens have a right in a peaceable manner to
assemble for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of
government, for redress of grievances, or for other purposes, by petition, address,
or remonstrance. No law abridging the freedom of speech shall be enacted.").
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ing government affairs. 4 After all, one of this country's founding
principles - the right to free speech - is premised upon the ability
of the public to acquire, consider, and debate government informa-
tion in a timely manner.5 Unreasonable restrictions or delay upon
the right to inspect government records can infringe upon a citi-
zen's right to free speech and hinder the public's decision-making
process, perhaps even reaching into the voting booth.
6
In fact, a citizen's right to access government records is so sac-
rosanct that all fifty states - and the federal government - have
promulgated statutes guaranteeing access to government docu-
ments.7 Although designed to increase public oversight and to en-
hance government accountability, in reality, these "freedom of
information" or "public records" laws have been applied for unin-
tended reasons and have caused unanticipated results.
4. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 18 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("I have long believed that a proper construction of the First Amend-
ment embraces a right of access to information about the conduct of public af-
fairs."); see also Rake v. Gorodetsky, 452 A.2d 1144, 1146 (R.1, 1982) ("The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that the public's right to know and have
access to information is an essential part of the First Amendment.").
5. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1980)
("'[The First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expres-
sion of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information
from which members of the public may draw.'" (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978))); Rake, 452 A.2d at 1146 ("Through the Free-
dom of Information Act, Congress has enhanced this First Amendment interest by
creating a clear right in the public and the press to have access to information held
by the government.").
6. See Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is not suffi-
cient, therefore, that the channels of communication be free of governmental re-
straints. Without some protection for the acquisition of information about the
operation of public institutions such as prisons by the public at large, the process
of self-governance contemplated by the Framers would be stripped of its sub-
stance."); In re Perry, 859 F.2d 1043, 1047 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Without question, the
right to free speech includes the right to timely speech on matters of current im-
portance."); see also Charles J. Wichmann III, Note, Ridding FOIA of Those "Unan-
ticipated Consequences": Repaving a Necessary Road to Freedom, 47 DuKE L.J.
1213, 1252 (1998) ("Limiting the amount of information available through [the
Freedom of Information Act] does limit, in a sense, the amount of power we have
over our government.").
7. See Burt A. Braverman & Wesley R. Heppler, A Practical Review of State
Open Records Laws, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 720, 722 (1981) (observing that Rhode
Island was the forty-ninth state to adopt a public records law). In 1983, Missis-
sippi became the fiftieth state to promulgate a freedom of information law. See
Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-61-1 (1999).
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For instance, public records laws were once envisioned by leg-
islators as a vehicle by which journalists, historians, citizens, and
other watchdog groups could discover government abuse.8 How-
ever, a General Accounting Office study revealed that only one out
of twenty requests were made by a journalist, scholar, or author.9
The study also disclosed that four out of five requests were made
by business executives for the principal purpose of obtaining com-
petitor information.' 0 Others have noted that freedom of informa-
tion laws have failed to achieve their intended results. For
8. See Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case
Study in the Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J.
649, 665 (1984).
9. Id. (citing Freedom of Information: Hearing on S. 587, S. 1247, S. 1730,
and S. 1751 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 97th Cong. 161, 776 (1981) (testimony of Jonathan Rose, Assistant Attorney
General, Department of Justice and testimony of Jack Landau, Director, Re-
porter's Committee for Freedom of the Press)).
10. See id. at 665-66 (citing Freedom of Information: Hearing on S. 587, S.
1247, S. 1730, and S. 1751 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 161 (1981) (testimony of Jack Landau, Director, Re-
porter's Committee for Freedom of the Press)) (noting that over 85% of the annual
33,000 Freedom of Information Act requests to the Federal Drug Administration
are from regulated industries or their representatives seeking information on com-
petitors). In 1988, Assistant U.S. Attorney General Stephen J. Markman testified
before the Subcommittee on Technology and the Law of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary:
Today, a typical FOIA scenario is not, as [originally] envisioned by the
Congress, the journalist who seeks information about the development of
public policy when he will shortly publish for the edification of the electo-
rate. Rather, it is the corporate lawyer seeking business secrets of a cli-
ent's competitors; the felon attempting to learn who informed against
him; the drug trafficker trying to evade the law; the foreign requester
seeking a benefit that our citizens cannot obtain from his country; the
private litigant who, constrained by discovery limitations, turns to the
FOIA to give him what a trial court will not. And as if these uses do not
diverge enough from the Act's original purpose, it is the public - the in-
tended beneficiary of the whole scheme - who bears nearly the entire fi-
nancial burden of honoring those requests while often reaping virtually
none of the benefits from them.
Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to Privacy and the Public's Right to Know: The "Cen-
tral Purpose" of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 41, 50-51 (1994)
(quoting Freedom of Information Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Technol-
ogy and the Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 37
(1988) (statement of Steven J. Markman, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Le-
gal Policy, Department of Justice)); see also Cahill v. Hous. Auth., 2000 Op. R.I.
Att'y Gen. PR 00-09 (unofficial finding) (requesting competitor's bid submitted pur-
suant to sealed bidding process), available at http':/www.riag.state.ri.us/access/
docs/prOO-09.htm.
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example, more than twenty years ago United States Supreme
Court Associate Justice Antonin Scalia wrote:
When one compares what the Freedom of Information Act
was in contemplation with what it has turned out to be in
reality, it is apparent that something went wrong. The act
and its amendments were promoted as a means of finding out
about the operations of government; they have been used
largely as a means of obtaining data in the government's
hands concerning private institutions. They were promoted
as a boon to the press, the public interest group, the little
guy; they have been used most frequently by corporate law-
yers. They were promoted as a minimal imposition on the op-
erations of government; they have greatly burdened
investigative agencies and the courts .... In short, it is a far
cry from John Q. Public finding out how his government
works."
Modeling its act after the federal Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA),12 the Rhode Island General Assembly promulgated the Ac-
cess to Public Records Act (APRA)13 to advance the First Amend-
ment rights of the press and the public. But, like its federal
counterpart, Rhode Island's public records law is sometimes used
to achieve results contrary to the precise intent of the APRA. 14 In
this age of increased open government, its application has simply
gone awry.
This Article examines Rhode Island's Access to Public Records
Act and queries: How open should Rhode Island government be?' 5
Part I traces the development of the FOIA and the APRA and dis-
cusses that the intent of both public records laws was to ensure the
disclosure of "official information" pertaining to government, but to
exempt documents unrelated to government activities. Part II re-
views the recurring themes articulated by the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court, as well as document requests tendered to
11. Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULA-
TION, Mar./Apr. 1982, at 16.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996).
13. 1979 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 202 § 1 (codified at R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-2-1 (West
2003)).
14. See infra notes 160-68 and accompanying text.
15. This question was posed in a headline printed on the front page of the May
5, 1997 edition of The Providence Journal Bulletin. Katherine Gregg, Secrecy in
Rhode Island: How Open Should Rhode Island Government Be?, PRov. J. BULL.,
May 5, 1997, at Al.
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administrative agencies. Part III proposes legislative initiatives
designed to realize the original intent of the Access to Public
Records Act. This Article concludes that although Rhode Island's
Access to Public Records Act guarantees public access to docu-
ments concerning government activity, great care must be exer-
cised so that records unrelated to government activity not be
disclosed in the name of public information.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Enacted in 1979, the APRA is a direct descendent of the FOIA.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has recognized this lineage on
numerous occasions 16 and statutory similarities between the two
public records laws reinforces this conclusion. 17 Accordingly, the
16. See, e.g., Providence Journal Co. v. Convention Ctr. Auth., 774 A.2d 40, 46
(R.I. 2001) ("Because APRA mirrors the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (cita-
tion omitted), it is appropriate to look to Federal case law interpreting FOIA to
assist in our interpretation of the statute."); R.I. Fed'n of Teachers v. Sundlun, 595
A.2d 799, 802 (R.I. 1991) ("The similarity between FOIA, as interpreted, and
APRA is striking."); Pawtucket Teachers Alliance v. Brady, 556 A.2d 556, 558 n.3
(R.I. 1989) ("Because APRA generally mirrors the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) (citation omitted), we find federal case law helpful in interpreting our open
record law.").
17. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1996) (declaring that each agency shall
"determine within ten days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holi-
days) after the receipt of any such request whether to comply with such request
and shall immediately notify the person making such request of such determina-
tion and the reasons therefore, and of the right of such person to appeal to the head
of the agency any adverse determination"), with R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-7(a) (1997)
(declaring that "[ainy denial of the right to inspect or copy records provided for
under this chapter shall be made to the person or entity requesting the right by the
public body official who has custody or control of the public record in writing giving
the specific reasons for the denial within ten (10) business days of the request and
indicating the procedures for appealing the denial."); compare 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(6)(C)(i) (1996) (declaring that "[a]ny person making a request to any
agency for records... shall be deemed to have exhausted his administrative reme-
dies with respect to such request if the agency fails to comply with the applicable
time limit provisions of this paragraph."), with R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-7(b) (1997)
(declaring that "[flailure to comply with a request to inspect or copy the public
record within the ten (10) business day period shall be deemed to be a denial.");
compare 5 U.S.C § 552(b) (1996) (declaring that "[alny reasonable segregable por-
tion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after dele-
tion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection."), with R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 38-2-2(4)(ii) (1997) (declaring that "any reasonably segregable portion as deter-
mined by the chief administrative officer of the public body of a public record ex-
cluded by this section shall be available for public inspections after the deletion of
the information which is the basis of the exclusion, if disclosure of the segregable
portion does not violate the intent of this section."). In addition to the foregoing
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FOIA legislative history is instructive in ascertaining the legisla-
tive intent of the APRA.
The present version of the FOIA can be traced to June 9, 1955,
when the Special Subcommittee on Government Information was
created.18 In his chartering letter, Representative William L.
Dawson did not suggest that all information maintained by the
government be available for public inspection, but instead ob-
served that:
An informed public makes the difference between mob rule
and democratic government. If the pertinent and necessary
information on government activities is denied the public, the
result is a weakening of the democratic process and the ulti-
mate atrophy of our form of government.' 9
Accordingly, some of the earliest legislative history supports the
conclusion that freedom of information laws were intended to re-
late only to documents concerning "government activities."20
As a result of the subcommittee's work, in 1958 the United
States Congress promulgated its first legislation aimed at limiting
the authority of executive agencies to withhold government infor-
procedural similarities, the federal and state freedom of information laws also
share similar statutory exemptions. Compare 5 U.S.C § 552(b)(3) (1996) (declaring
the FOIA inapplicable to matters "specifically exempted from disclosure by stat-
ute"), with R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-2-2(4)(i)(S) (1997) (declaring the APRA inapplica-
ble to "[riecords, reports, opinions, information, and statements required to be kept
confidential by federal law or regulation or state law, or rule of court"); compare 5
U.S.C § 552(b)(4) (1996) (exempting "trade secrets and commercial or financial in-
formation obtained from a person and privileged or confidential"), with R.I. GEN.
LAws § 38-2-2(4)(i)(B) (1997) (exempting "[t~rade secrets and commercial or finan-
cial information obtained from a person, firm, or corporation which is of a privi-
leged or confidential nature"); compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1996) (exempting
"records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes" provided the
records fall within one of six categories), with R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(4)(i)(D)
(1997) (exempting "[a]ll records maintained by law enforcement agencies for crimi-
nal law enforcement and all records relating to the detection and investigation of
crime" provided the records fall within one of six categories).
18. H.R. REP. No. 93-876, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267, 6268.
19. Id. (emphasis added). Representative Dawson's chartering letter charged
the subcommittee with specified goals, including studying the operation of all
agencies and officials within the executive branch, determining the efficiency and
economy of such operation, ascertaining the trend in the availability of govern-
ment information, and scrutinizing the information practices of executive agencies
in the light of their propriety, fitness, and legality. Id.
20. Id. ("[W]ith this guiding purpose your Subcommittee will ascertain the
trend in the availability of Government information." (quoting Representative
Dawson's letter)) (emphasis added).
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mation. 21 The 1958 enactment added one sentence to the 1789
"housekeeping" statute,22 a law generally relied upon by federal
agencies "to regulate the[ir] business" and "to withhold certain
types of information from the public."23 In its entirety, the 1958
amendment stated that the 1789 "housekeeping" statute "does not
authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the
availability of records to the public."24
The subcommittee offered other, more substantial enactments,
such as Public Law 89-487, entitled the Freedom of Information
Act of 1966 (1966 FOIA).25 As originally promulgated, the 1966
FOIA was an amendment to section 3 of the.Administrative Proce-
dures Act of 1946.26 Similar to Dawson's chartering letter, the
House of Representatives Report recommending passage of the
1966 FOIA distinguished documents pertaining to the operation of
government from documents pertaining to private citizens.27 In
fact, the House Report states:
It is vital to our way of life to reach a workable balance be-
tween the right of the public to know and the need of the Gov-
21. Id. at 6269.
22. The "Housekeeping" statute presently states:
The head of an Executive department or military department may pre-
scribe regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its
employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the cus-
tody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property. This sec-
tion does not authorize withholding information from the public or
limiting the availability of records to the public.
5 U.S.C. § 301 (1996) (original version at 5 U.S.C. § 22).
23. H.R. REP. No. 92-1419 (1972).
24. Id.
25. See Pus. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C.§ 552 (1988)).
26. See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 1 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2418, 2418.
27. Id. at 8-9, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2425-26 (identifying, inter
alia, "concurring and dissenting opinions," as well as "all final votes of multi-
headed agencies in any regulatory or adjudicative proceeding" as the types of docu-
ments deemed public by the 1966 FOIA); id. ("The public has a need to know, for
example, the details of an agency opinion or statement of policy on an income tax
matter, but there is no need to identify the individuals involved in a tax matter if
the identification has no bearing or effect on the general public."); id. at 8, re-
printed in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2425 ("Subsection (b) solves the conflict between
the requirement for public access to records of agency actions and the need to pro-
tect individual privacy. It permits an agency to delete personal identifications
from its public records 'to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.'").
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ernment to keep information in confidence to the extent
necessary without permitting indiscriminate secrecy. The
right of the individual to be able to find out how his Govern-
ment is operating can be just as important to him as his right
to privacy and his right to confide in his Government.28
Further illustrating the type of information intended to be dis-
closed, the House Report continues:
In addition to the orders and opinions required to be made
public by the present law, subsection (b) of S. 1160 would re-
quire agencies to make available statements of policy, inter-
pretations, staff manuals, and instructions that affect any
member of the public. This material is the end product of
Federal administration. It has the force and effect of law in
most cases, yet under the present statute these Federal
agency decisions have been kept secret from the members of
the public affected by the decisions.
As the Federal Government has extended its activities to
solve the Nation's expanding problems - and particularly in
the 20 years since the Administrative Procedure Act was es-
tablished - the bureaucracy has developed its own form of
case law. This law is embodied in thousands of orders, opin-
ions, statements, and instructions issued by hundreds of
agencies. This is the material which would be made available
under subsection (b) of S. 1160.29
Similarly, the Senate Report on the 1966 FOIA notes:
The authority to delete identifying details after written justi-
fication is necessary in order to be able to balance the public's
right to know with the private citizen's right to be secure in
his personal affairs which have no bearing or effect on the
general public. For example, it may be pertinent to know
that unseasonably harsh weather has caused an increase in
public relief costs; but it is not necessary that the identity of
any person so affected be made public.30
28. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2423 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2424 (emphasis added); see also
Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) (observing that the 1966 FOIA
is broadly conceived "to permit access to official information long shielded unneces-
sarily from public view"), superceded by statute (Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561
(1974) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (West 1998))).
30. S. REp. No. 89-813, at 7 (1965).
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The 1966 FOIA was signed into law on July 4, 1966 and be-
came effective July 4, 1967.31 Prior to its effective date, United
States Attorney General Ramsey Clark provided guidance concern-
ing the intent and the requirements of the new law. 32 Attorney
General Clark explained:
If government is to be truly of, by, and for the people, the
people must know in detail the activities of government.
Nothing so diminishes democracy as secrecy. Self-govern-
ment, the maximum participation of the citizenry in affairs of
state, is meaningful only with an informed public. How can
we govern ourselves if we know not how we govern? Never
was it more important than in our times of mass society,
when government affects each individual in so many ways,
that the right of the people to know the actions of their gov-
ernment be secure ....
At the same time, this law gives assurance to the individ-
ual citizen that his private rights will not be violated. The
individual deals with the [glovernment in a number of pro-
tected relationships which could be destroyed if the right to
know were not modulated by principles of confidentiality and
privacy. Such materials as tax reports, medical and person-
nel files, and trade secrets must remain outside the zone of
accessibility. 33
Once described as "a relatively toothless beast, sometimes
kicked about shamelessly by the agencies," the 1966 FOIA toler-
ated agency delays and allowed its nine statutory exemptions to be
interpreted broadly.34 Against the backdrop of Watergate, Con-
gress responded to these deficiencies by enacting the Freedom of
31. See Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Revising Public Infor-
mation Provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 895 (July 11, 1966) ("This legislation springs from one of our most essential
principles: a democracy works best when the people have all the information that
the security of the Nation permits. No one should be able to pull curtains of se-
crecy around decisions which can be revealed without injury to the public
interest.").
32. See H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, at 5 (1972). With the exception of the 1966
FOIA and its concomitant legislative history, House Report No. 1419 describes At-
torney General Clark's memorandum as "the single most important interpretative
document upon which executive departments and agencies rely to defend judg-
ments on what information should be made available to the public under the act."
Id. at 64.
33. See id. at 5-6 (emphases added).
34. Scalia, supra note 11, at 15.
2003]
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Information Act of 1974 (1974 FOIA).35 This amendment required
greater agency accountability and adopted new requirements that
included providing wider availability of agency indexes; allowing
citizens to request documents by description, rather than by spe-
cific title or number; requiring agencies to respond to a request
within a specified time period; mandating records be segregated so
that an entire category of records could not be classified as exempt;
permitting attorneys' fees and court costs to a prevailing plaintiff;
and granting reviewing courts authority to review documents in
camera.36 The 1974 FOIA did not alter the intent of the 1966
FOIA that records pertaining to government activities be
disclosed.3 7
Even though the Freedom of Information Act was enacted in
1966, it would be ten more years before a similar law was proposed
in Rhode Island.38 Despite the dearth of Rhode Island legislative
history, contemporaneous news reports demonstrate that Rhode
Island legislators were motivated by the same considerations as
the federal legislators. 39
For instance, in 1976 East Greenwich Representative Ernest
C. Torres introduced the precursor to the present version of the
APRA, stating that "[tihe people have a right to know what their
government is doing."40 Several years later, after passage of the
1979 APRA, Newport Representative, and Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, Jeffrey J. Teitz predicted that the new APRA
"will allow people to uncover information on governmental policy
making. It will allow citizens to become more aware of how gov-
ernment decisions are made."41 One newspaper even provided an
35. See Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974); see also Scalia, supra
note 11, at 15.
36. See H.R. REP. No. 93-876 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267,
6271-74; see also Cate et al., supra note 10, at 48.
37. See generally H.R. REP. No. 93-876, at 6271-74 (1974).
38. See Joel H. Sekers & John P. Hackett, Bills Would Open Public Records,
PROV. J. BULL., Jan. 28, 1976, at B4 (reporting the introduction of open records law
into the House of Representatives and the Senate).
39. See, e.g., Thomas E. Walsh & Joel H. Sekers, Sunshine Bill to Open Gov-
ernment Records to Public Submitted, PRov. J. BULL., Mar. 4, 1978, at A7 (report-
ing that Representative Dickinson introduced freedom of information act
legislation modeled after the federal law).
40. See Sekers & Hackett, supra note 38.
41. Thomas E. Walsh, New Law Won't Bring Rush to Scan Records, PROv. J.
BULL., July 1, 1979, at C2.
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example of the type of information now publicly available - the
supporting data for a municipal budget.4 2
These reported legislator comments, combined with the simi-
larities between the FOIA and the APRA, demonstrate that the
APRA was modeled after the FOIA and share common goals.4 3
Both freedom of information laws were designed to permit inspec-
tion of official government documents, but to exempt from disclo-
sure other records unrelated to government.44 As enacted, the
purpose section of the APRA declared:
The public's right to access to records pertaining to the policy-
making responsibilities of government and the individual's
right to dignity and privacy are both recognized to be princi-
ples of the utmost importance in a free society. The purpose
of this act is to facilitate public access to governmental records
which pertain to the policy-making functions of public bodies
and/or are relevant to the public health, safety, and welfare.
It is also the intent of this act to protect from disclosure infor-
mation about particular individuals maintained in the files of
public bodies when disclosure would constitute an unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy.4 5
42. Id.
43. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text; see also R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-
2-2(4)(i) (1997 & Supp. 2002) (defining "public record" to include "other material
regardless of physical form or characteristics made or received pursuant to law or
ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency"),
as enacted by 1982 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 416 § 1 (emphasis added). But see R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 38-2-3(a) (West 2003) (unless otherwise exempt "all records maintained or
kept on file by any public body, whether or not those records are required by any
law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public records."), as enacted by 1979 R.I.
Pub. Laws ch. 202 § 1 (emphasis added).
45. 1979 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 202 § 1 (emphasis added). In 1998, the General
Assembly amended the purpose section by deleting references to the policy-making
responsibilities of government and/or the public health, safety, and welfare. See
1998 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 378 § 1. The purpose section presently provides that:
The public's right to access to public records and the individual's right to
dignity and privacy are both recognized to be principles of the utmost im-
portance in a free society. The purpose of this act is to facilitate public
access to public records. It is also the intent of this chapter to protect from
disclosure information about particular individuals maintained in the
files of public bodies when disclosure would constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-1 (1997 & Supp. 2002), amended by 1998 R.I. Pub. Laws
ch. 378 § 1. The 1998 amendment to section 38-2-1 of the Rhode Island General
Laws should not be considered a substantive change to the purpose section of the
APRA. See Providence Journal Co. v. Convention Ctr. Auth., 774 A.2d 40, 51 n.9
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Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted
the FOIA as creating a broad right of access to "official informa-
tion."46 A prominent example of this interpretation occurred in
United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press,47 where the Court examined a request for
individuals' criminal records and noted that the basic purpose of
the FOIA was "'to open agency action to the light of public scru-
tiny.'" 48 The Court continued that the FOIA disclosure require-
ment is premised upon:
the citizens' right to be informed about "what their govern-
ment is up to." Official information that sheds light on an
agency's performance of its statutory duties falls squarely
within that statutory purpose. That purpose, however, is not
fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens
that is accumulated in various governmental files but that
reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct.49
Subsequent cases and authorities have reinforced this interpreta-
tion, which has become known as the "central purpose" doctrine. 50
(R.I. 2001) (Flanders, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In my opinion
the 1998 amendments merely clarified legislative intent rather than effecting a
substantive change in the legislation.").
46. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772 (1989) ("Official information that sheds light on an
agency's performance of its statutory duties falls squarely within [the FOIA's pur-
pose." (quoting Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80.(1973))).
47. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
48. Id. at 772 (quoting Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976)).
49. Id. at 773 (quoting Rose, 425 U.S. at 360-61).
50. In United States Department of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991), the
United States Supreme Court considered whether releasing the names of individ-
ual Haitians who attempted to emigrate illegally to the United States, but who
were involuntarily returned, would constitute "a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy." Id. at 166; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1996) (exempting "per-
sonnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"). After reviewing the FOIA's
central purpose language in United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Com-
mittee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989), the Court determined that
even though the public interest in monitoring Haiti's compliance with its obliga-
tions not to persecute returnees was cognizable under FOIA, the Court nonethe-
less opined that this public interest was adequately served by disclosing the
requested documents with the emigrants' identities redacted. Ray, 502 U.S. at 178.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that revealing the redacted identities of the ille-
gal emigrants would have "constitute[d] a clearly unwarranted invasion of... pri-
vacy." Id. Several years later in United States Department of Defense v. Federal
Labor Relations Authority, 510 U.S. 487 (1994), the Supreme Court examined
whether disclosing the home addresses of collective bargaining unit employees
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II. APPLICATION OF THE ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS ACT IN
RHODE ISLAND
Even though the FOIA's and the APRA's central purpose
demonstrate an intent to open documents concerning government
activities, in reality the APRA is also invoked by requesting parties
to encroach into areas not envisioned when Rhode Island's public
records law was enacted. In particular, these areas concern re-
quests for government-maintained documents that do not relate to
government operations.5 l The result is an expansion of the APRA
to include records that not only promote public participation and
government oversight, but also reveal information about private
citizens unrelated to government activities.5 2 This dichotomy is
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Again the
Court relied upon Reporters Committee and stated that in weighing the competing
interests, the "only relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis [was
the] extent to which disclosure of the information would 'she[d] light on an
agency's performance of its statutory duties' or otherwise let citizens know 'What
their government is up to.'" Id. at 497 (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773).
After focusing on the FOIA's central purpose,' the Court acknowledged that even
though disclosure of home addresses may allow unions to communicate more effec-
tively with employees, the public interest was "negligible, at best." Id. at 497. The
Court stated that revealing the employees' home addresses "would not appreciably
further 'the citizens' right to be informed about what their government is up to,'"
id. (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773) and in fact emphasized that "such
disclosure would reveal little or nothing about the employing agencies or their ac-
tivities." Id. at 497; see also id. at 501 ("Moreover, when we consider that other
parties, such as commercial advertisers and solicitors, must have the same access
under FOIA as the unions to the employee address lists sought in this case, (cita-
tions omitted) it is clear that the individual privacy interest that would be pro-
tected by nondisclosure is far from insignificant."); Bibles v. Oregon Natural
Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355, 355-56 (1997) ("'[T]he only relevant public interest in
the FOIA balancing analysis' is 'the extent to which disclosure of the information
sought would 'she[d] light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties' or
otherwise let citizens know 'what their government is up to."') (quoting Reporters
Comm., 489 U.S. at 773) (alteration in original); Cate et al., supra note 10, at 67
("The test for whether a request seeks 'official information' should be the touch-
stone for disclosure under the FOIA. Rather than limit the application of a 'central
purpose' test to one or more of the FOIA exemptions, only information that will
serve the purpose of ensuring that 'the Government's activities be opened to the
sharp eye of public scrutiny' should ever be subject to disclosure under the FOIA.");
Wichmann, supra note 6, at 1231 ("[Tlhe FOIA's central purpose is to ensure that
the Government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that
information about private citizens that happens to be in the warehouse of the Gov-
ernment be so disclosed.").
51. See infra notes 132-68 and accompanying text.
52. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 15 ("The Freedom of Information Act is part
of the basic weaponry of modern regulatory war, deployable against regulators and
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highlighted by comparing the government oversight themes ex-
pressed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court to administrative
level requests received by local and state public bodies.
A. The Access to Public Records Act and the Rhode Island
Supreme Court53
Evaluation of an APRA request involves a two step pro-
regulated alike."); Cate et al., supra note 10, at 44 ("Such an extension of the FOIA
violates the purpose of the Act and transforms it 'into a vehicle serving purely
private interests, to the detriment of its intended public interest.'"); Wald, supra
note 8, at 665 ("Businesses quickly learned how to use the FOIA to get information
about their competitors. Lawyers found out that they could often extract facts
more quickly through FOIA requests than through the civil discovery system.").
53. There have been thirteen APRA cases to reach the Rhode Island Supreme
Court: (1) Providence Journal Co. v. Convention Ctr. Auth., 774 A.2d 40 (R.I.
2001) (commercial and financial documents leading to final contract are exempt
from public disclosure, but final contract is a public record subject to redacting
confidential or privileged information); (2) Robinson v. Malinoff, 770 A.2d 874 (R.I.
2001) (police investigation records related to a particular police officer exempt
from public disclosure); (3) Bernard v. Vose, 730 A.2d 30 (R.I. 1999) (inmate's
prison parole board records not public); (4) Direct Action for Rights & Equal. v.
Gannon, 713 A.2d 218 (R.I. 1998) (civilian complaints of police misconduct are
subject to public disclosure in redacted form whenever final action occurred); (5)
Edward A. Sherman Publ'g Co. v. Carpender, 659 A.2d 1117 (R.I. 1995) (names of
teachers who received notice of non-renewal of employment are not public unless
and until date of termination occurred); (6) In re Access to Certain Records, 637
A.2d 1063 (R.I. 1994) (decisions of Advisory Committee, advisory opinions, and
data are public records); (7) Providence Journal Co. v. Sundlun, 616 A.2d 1131
(R.I. 1992) (records identifying state employees who received layoff notices not
public until employee is terminated); (8) R.I. Fed'n of Teachers v. Sundlun, 595
A.2d 799 (R.I. 1991) (APRA does not provide a remedy to prevent public
disclosure); (9) Providence Journal Co. v. Kane, 577 A.2d 661 (R.I. 1990) (records
identifying individual state employees are not public); (10) Charlesgate Nursing
Ctr. v. Bordeleau, 568 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1990) (financial record related to state
reimbursement of nursing facility is public); (11) Pawtucket Teachers Alliance v.
Brady, 556 A.2d 556 (R.I. 1989) (management study report relating to school's
principal and school's operations is not a public record); (12) Hydron Labs., Inc. v.
Dep't of the Attorney Gen., 492 A.2d 135 (R.I. 1985) (documents determined to be
work-product exempt from public disclosure); (13) Rake v. Gorodetsky, 452 A.2d
1144 (R.I. 1982) (police department reports are not exempt from public disclosure
pursuant to the personnel records exception or the investigatory records
exception). Furthermore, two APRA cases are pending in the Rhode Island
Supreme Court with opinions expected to be rendered during the 2002-03 term:
(1) Appellant's Brief at 1, Direct Action for Rights & Equal. v. Gannon, - A.2d -
(R.I. 2003) (No. 99-22A) (city's appeal of trial justice's order awarding costs,
attorneys' fees, and waiving the cost of documents associated with Direct Action for
Rights & Equal. v. Gannon, 713 A.2d 218 (R.I. 1998)); (2) Appellant's Brief at 1,
Providence Journal Co. v. Convention Ctr. Auth., - A.2d - (R.I. 2003) (No. 02-
0132) (newspaper's appeal of trial justice's decision redacting final prices, rates,
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cess.54 Upon receipt of an APRA request, an agency must first de-
termine whether a requested document falls within any of the
twenty-three exemptions delineated within the APRA.a s If a docu-
ment falls within an enumerated exemption, that record is deemed
exempt from public disclosure and no further inquiry is
performed.5 6
If a document does not fall within an enumerated exemption, a
balancing test must be performed. 57 With respect to this second
step, the agency must balance the public interest in disclosure ver-
sus the individual's privacy interest if the document is disclosed.58
If the privacy interest outweighs the public interest, the document
(or portions thereof) are exempt from public disclosure.59 Only af-
ter determining that a document is not exempt by any of the enu-
merated exemptions, and that the public interest in disclosure
outweighs the individual's privacy interest, is a document deemed
a public record that must be disclosed within ten business days. 60
1. Identifiable Records
Among the most frequently cited exemptions - and one of the
broadest - is section 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) of the Rhode Island General
Laws,6l which exempts from public disclosure "[aill records which
and references to complimentary rooms or services from the final contract in
Providence Journal Co. v. Convention Center Authority, 774 A.2d 40 (R.I. 2001)).
54. PATRICK C. LYNCH, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDE TO OPEN GOVERN-
MENT IN RHODE ISLAND 61 (3d ed. 2002), available at http://www.riag.state.ri.us/




57. Id.; see also Kane, 577 A.2d at 663 ("Any balancing of interests arises only
after a record has first been determined to be a public record.").
58. LYNCH, supra note 54.
59. Id.
60. Id.; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-7(b) (West 2003) ("Except that for good
cause this limit may be extended for a period not to exceed thirty (30) business
days.").
61. From its inception in 1979 until July 1998, the statutory exemptions were
numerically delineated. Chapter 378, section 1 of the 1998 Rhode Island Public
Laws changed this designation to alphabetical. See 1998 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 378
§ 1. For consistency purposes, all exemptions in this Article are cited according to
the present-day alphabetical designation, although the statutory provision itself
references the text applicable when cited. In addition, this Article observes that
section 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) of the Rhode Island General Laws has been consistently
referenced as the "personnel-records exemption." See, e.g., Kane, 577 A.2d at 662
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are identifiable to an individual applicant for benefits, client, pa-
tient, student, or employee."62 Prior to its 1991 amendment, this
exemption had been read consistently to allow public bodies to re-
dact the identities of various individuals, or when a document per-
tained only to one person, to exempt the entire record. 63
In Pawtucket Teachers Alliance, Local No. 920 v. Brady,64 the
Pawtucket School Committee appointed a new principal to one of
its schools and, shortly thereafter, received a series of complaints
concerning the operation of the school and the relationship be-
tween the principal and the teaching staff.65 The school committee
authorized a management study of the school's operations, and ac-
cordingly, hired an outside consultant to review the operations. 66
(stating that the Rhode Island Supreme Court also considered the personnel-re-
cord exemption in Pawtucket Teachers Alliance v. Brady, 556 A.2d 556 (R.I.
1989)); Rake v. Gorodetsky, 452 A.2d 1144, 1148 (R.I. 1982) ("For the stated rea-
sons we conclude that the reports in question are not exempt from disclosure pur-
suant to the personnel-records exemption, § 38-2-2[(4)(i)(A)(I)."). Because section
38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) exempts from disclosure not only personnel-records, but instead
"[aill records which are identifiable to an individual applicant for benefits, client,
patient, student, or employee," this Article refers to this provision as the "identifi-
able records exemption."
62. R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) (West 2003). In its entirety, this provi-
sion presently exempts from public disclosure:
[aill records which are identifiable to an individual applicant for benefits,
client, patient, student, or employee; including, but not limited to, person-
nel, medical treatment, welfare, employment security, pupil records, all
records relating to a client/attorney relationship and to a doctor/patient
relationship, and all personal or medical information relating to an indi-
vidual in any files, including information relating to medical or psycholog-
ical facts, personal finances, welfare, employment security, student
performance, or information in personnel files maintained to hire, evalu-
ate, promote, or discipline any employee of a public body; provided, how-
ever, with respect to employees, the name, gross salary, salary range, total
cost of paid fringe benefits, gross amount received in overtime, and other
remuneration in addition to salary, job title, job description, dates of em-
ployment and positions held with the state or municipality, work location,
business telephone number, the city or town of residence, and date of termi-
nation shall be public.
Id. (emphasis added by 1991 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 208 § 1).
63. See infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text; see also R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-
2-2(4)(ii) (West 2003) ("[Any reasonably segregable portion of a public record ex-
cluded by this section shall be available for public inspections after the deletion of
the information which is the basis of the exclusion, if disclosure of the segregable
portion does not violate the intent of this section.").
64. 556 A.2d 556 (R.I. 1989).
65. Id. at 557.
66. Id.
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After conducting numerous interviews with the principal and the
teachers, the consultant summarized the findings in a written re-
port, which was subsequently presented to the school committee in
a closed session and ordered sealed.67 Requests to obtain the
sealed document from the school committee were rebuffed and, af-
ter the Pawtucket Teachers Alliance filed a lawsuit, the Rhode Is-
land Superior Court determined that the sealed report was not a
public record. 68
The Pawtucket Teachers Alliance appealed to the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court and argued that the public's right to know the
contents of the report "clearly outweigh[ed] the principal's right to
privacy in these circumstances," particularly since widespread me-
dia coverage had already publicized the school controversy, includ-
ing the school principal's identity.69 The supreme court rejected
this policy argument and instead focused on the plain language of
section 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) of the Rhode Island General Laws, which
at that time exempted all records identifiable to an individual em-
ployee.70 The supreme court concluded that:
[T]he report at issue in the present case specifically relates to
the job performance of a single readily identifiable individual.
Even if all references to proper names were deleted, the prin-
cipal's identity would still be abundantly clear from the entire
context of the report.71
Consequently, as the consultant's report was not susceptible to
redaction without contravening section 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I), the entire
67. Id. The report was sealed pursuant to the Open Meetings Act, R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 42-46-7 (1993 & Supp. 2002). According to the APRA, "[amny minutes of a
meeting of a public body which are not required to be disclosed pursuant to [the
Open Meetings Act]" are exempt from public disclosure. R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-2-
2(4)(i)(J) (West 2003).
68. See Brady, 556 A.2d at 557-58 (holding that the sealed report fell within
section 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) of the Rhode Island General Laws, exempting documents
identifiable to an individual employee).
69. Id. at 559.
70. Id. at 558-59. Prior to its 1991 amendment, section 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) of the
Rhode Island General Laws exempted "[all records which are identifiable to an
individual applicant for benefits, client, patient, student, or employee; including,
but not limited to, personnel, medical treatment, welfare, employment security,
and pupil records and all records relating to a client/attorney relationship and to a
doctor/patient relationship." Id. at 558 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I)
(1986)); see supra note 62 (present version of R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I)
(1997 & Supp. 2002)).
71. Id. at 559.
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document was deemed exempt from public disclosure.72 Other
cases have also strictly interpreted the identifiable records
exemption.
For instance, in Providence Journal v. Kane,73 a local newspa-
per sought personnel records that would "uniquely identify state
employees." 74 But again, without specific consideration to the ar-
guably benign nature of the requested documents, the supreme
court relied upon the plain language of section 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I),
noting that the:
request for information that will uniquely identify State em-
ployees by name, address, and employment history directly
contravenes the clear proscription set forth in § 38-2-2
against disclosure of all records which are identifiable to an
individual employee, including personnel records. 75
Accordingly, these documents were also deemed exempt from pub-
lic disclosure. 76
72. Id. at 560 ("Consequently we conclude that the trial justice committed no
abuse of discretion in denying plaintiffs request for temporary and permanent in-
junctive relief.").
73. 577 A.2d 661 (R.I. 1990).
74. By letter dated February 3, 1989, a staff writer from The Providence Jour-
nal-Bulletin requested, in relevant part:
information that will uniquely identify state employees by name, address,
and employee number, and include their employment history, qualifica-
tions, job classification, relationship to the civil service system, minority
and other special status, position by agency and by other identifiers, work
schedule, the components of their pay, their pay and overtime history, va-
cation and sick leave status.
Similarly, we need to know the history of personnel actions beginning
with fiscal 1985-86, including both present and former state employees,
recounting their comings and goings and how their status changed in-
between.
Letter from Bruce C. Landis, Staff Writer, The Providence Journal-Bulletin, to
John Kane, Director of Administration, State of Rhode Island (Feb. 3, 1989) (on file
with author). Compared to other APRA requests, the records sought in Kane, al-
though voluminous, in large part cannot be considered to invade one's personal
privacy if disclosed. Cf. In re Div. of Motor Vehicles, 1999 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR
99-01 (Aug. 23, 1999) (stating that the request of the staff writer from The Provi-
dence Journal-Bulletin for "a list of all the handicap plaques issued with their
numbers, the names of the recipients, the addresses of the recipients and the medi-
cal reason for granting each plaque" deemed exempt from disclosure), available at
http://www.riag.state.ri.us/opinion/docs/advpr99-01.htm; see also infra notes 132-
54 and accompanying text.
75. Providence Journal Co. v. Kane, 577 A.2d 661, 665 (R.I. 1990).
76. Id.
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In response to Kane, the General Assembly amended the all-
encompassing exemption for records identifiable to an individual
employee. 77 The 1991 amendment left intact the exemption for
"[aill records which are identifiable to an individual applicant for
benefits, client, patient, student, or employee," but expressly delin-
eated fourteen categories of employee records deemed public even
though identifiable to a particular employee. 78 The last clause of
amended section 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) states that:
With respect to employees, the name, gross salary, salary
range, total cost of paid fringe benefits, gross amount re-
ceived in overtime and other remuneration in addition to sal-
ary, job title, job description, dates of employment and
positions held with the state or municipality, work location,
business telephone number, the city or town of residence, and
date of termination shall be public.79
Within a year of this amendment, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court in Providence Journal Co. v. Sundlun8 was again called
upon to examine section 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I). In that case, the su-
preme court examined the 1991 amendment with respect to a pub-
lic records request for the "names and positions of the 129 non-
union state employees who were being laid-off."8 ' Within days,
The Providence Journal made a second APRA request seeking the
"names and positions of the 492 state employees who were mem-
bers of a union and who were being laid-off."8 2
Despite the supreme court's prior strict construction in Brady
and Kane, The Providence Journal Company argued to the su-
preme court that section 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) "applies exclusively to
records revealing personal information relating to an identifiable
77. See 1991 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 208 § 1; see also Edward A. Sherman Publ'g
Co. v. Carpender, 659 A.2d 1117, 1121 (R.I. 1995).
78. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) (West 2003).
79. Id.
80. 616 A.2d 1131 (R.I. 1992).
81. Id. at 1132.
82. Id. The supreme court's opinion identifies three separate lists responsive
to The Providence Journal-Bulletin's request. List One identified state employees
that would receive layoff notices, but that were never implemented. Id. at 1133.
List Two concerned state employees that were issued layoff notices, but who exer-
cised their right to "bump" an employee with less seniority and accept a lower-level
position within state government. Id. Finally, List Three contained the names of
state employees who will actually be laid-off from state employment. Id.
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employee."8 3 The supreme court rejected the newspaper's conten-
tion and recognized that:
Although the legislative intent may have been to protect
against the release of personal or confidential information, it
implemented this intention by prohibiting the release of all
records that would be identifiable to an individual person,
whether or not such records might in another context be con-
strued as either personal or confidential.8 4
Continuing the same literal interpretation analyses, the su-
preme court concluded that there was "no question" that the iden-
tities of yet-to-be terminated employees were not public records.8 5
In particular, the justices noted that the last clause of the 1991
amendment declared that "the name ... and date of termination
shall be public."8 6 Accordingly, the supreme court opined that "[i]t
is not until an employee has been terminated from his or her em-
ployment that the last proviso of § 38-2-2[(4)(i)(A)(I)] becomes op-
erative and, in effect, authorizes the release of the names of those
terminated employees to the public."87
A similar analysis was applied in Edward A. Sherman Pub-
lishing Co. v. Carpender,s8 where an APRA request was made con-
cerning the identities of twenty-eight Portsmouth teachers who
had received layoff notices, but had yet-to-be terminated.8 9 In
Carpender, the supreme court found Sundlun to be "controlling,"
and concluded that the names of teachers receiving layoff notices
83. Id. at 1135.
84. Id. at 1134. To support its conclusion, the supreme court cited section 38-
2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) of the Rhode Island General Laws and emphasized that, in relevant
part, this provision exempts "[aill records which are identifiable to an individual
applicant for benefits, client, patient, student, or employee." Id. (emphases added).
85. Id. at 1135 (unless delineated, section 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) of the Rhode Is-
land General Laws "explicitly exempts from disclosure records identifying an em-
ployee"); see also R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I), amended by 1991 R.I. Pub.
Laws ch. 208 § 1 ("[Wlith respect to employees, the name ... and date of termina-
tion shall be public.").
86. Sundlun, 616 A.2d at 1134.
87. Id. at 1135.
88, 659 A.2d 1117 (R.I. 1995).
89. The written notifications were provided pursuant to section 16-13-3 of the
Rhode Island General Laws. In relevant part, section 16-13-3, amended by chapter
170, section 1 of the 1992 Public Laws provides: "Whenever a tenured teacher in
continuous service is to be dismissed, the notice of such dismissal shall be given to
the teacher in writing on or before March 1st of the school year immediately pre-
ceding the school year in which the dismissal is to become effective." Id. at 1119.
20031 AN APPLICATION GONE AWRY
were not public records "until the layoffs [became] final at the end
of the school year."90
2. Police Records
In Rake v. Gorodetsky,91 Brown University students and edi-
tors of a quarterly tabloid newspaper wrote to the Chief of the
Providence Police Department requesting "copies of all Providence
police department hearing officers' reports concerning civilian com-
plaints of police brutality" from 1973 through June 2, 1980.92
When the students did not receive a response, they appealed to the
Commissioner of Public Safety for the City of Providence.9 3
On behalf of the City, a Providence solicitor soon responded to
the review petition, asserting that the City required additional
time to compile the hearing officers' reports.94 Later, when addi-
tional measures failed to obtain the requested reports, the stu-
dents filed a lawsuit in the Rhode Island Superior Court seeking
injunctive relief.95 The superior court rejected the City's argument
that the reports were exempt from public disclosure en toto, but
nonetheless did agree that disclosure of the complainants' and the
police officers' identities would infringe upon their privacy inter-
ests.96 Accordingly, the trial justice ordered the hearing officers'
90. Id. at 1122.
91. 452 A.2d 1144 (R.I. 1982).
92. Id. at 1146; see also Rake v. Gorodetsky, C.A. No. 81-1222, at 2 (R.I. Super.
Ct. Aug. 3, 1981).
93. Rake v. Gorodetsky, 452 A.2d 1144, 1146 (R.I. 1982). As enacted, section
38-2-8 of the Rhode Island General Laws provided: "Any person denied the right to
inspect a record of a public body by the custodian of said record may petition the
chief administrative officer of that public body for a review of the determination
made by his/her subordinate." 1979 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 202 § 1.
94. Rake, 452 A.2d at 1146.
95. Id.
96. See Rake, at 9-10 (No. 81-1222). It is noteworthy that the trial justice's
decision to redact the identities of the police officers and the civilian complainants
was not based upon any specific statutory authority. Instead, the trial justice
wrote:
There has been presented a persuasive argument, however, with respect
to the right of privacy of the police officers and the complainants involved.
As the plaintiffs have conceded that their interest lies in factual situa-
tions and the investigative officer's handling and recommendations
thereof, and have offered no evidence that the intent of the consent decree
or the statute would be abrogated if names were omitted, this [clourt sees
* no need to include the names of the police officers or complainants in-
volved in the reports.
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reports disseminated, but directed that the parties' names be
redacted. 97
On appeal, the supreme court rejected the City's dual argu-
ments that the hearing officers' reports were exempt either by the
non-final investigatory records exemption, 98 or by the identifiable
records exemption. 99 The supreme court stated that since the
hearing officers' reports contained the action of the police chief
thereon, the reports could only be considered the "final action
taken on the matter." 00 Moreover, the justices rejected the City's
alternative argument that the reports were exempt from public
disclosure by virtue of the identifiable records exemption. On this
point, the supreme court wrote that since section 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I)
requires "that the records must be identifiable to an individual ap-
plicant in order for the exemption to take effect," and since the
trial justice ordered the parties' identities redacted, "an important
prerequisite for application of [the identifiable records exemption]
has not been met. "'0
Id. at 9. But see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) (West 2003), as enacted by 1979
R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 202 § 1 (exempting "[aill records which are identifiable to an
individual applicant for benefits, client, patient, student, or employee") (emphasis
added). The balancing test, which could permit redaction of identities in the ap-
propriate circumstances, was not recognized by the Rhode Island Supreme Court
until Providence Journal Co. v. Kane, 577 A.2d 661 (R.I. 1990). See In re Bristol
Police Dep't, 2000 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 00-04 (Mar. 23, 2000) (disclosing the iden-
tity of a third party witness to a crime subject to case-by-case balancing test),
available at http://www.riag.state.ri.uslopinion/docs/advprOO-04.html; In re Narra-
gansett Police Dep't, 1999 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 99-02 (Sept. 7, 1999) (disclosing
the identity of crime victim subject to case-by-case balancing test), available at
http://www.riag.state.ri.us/opinion/docs/advpr99-02.html.
97. Rake, at 10 (C.A. No. 81-1222).
98. R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-2-2(4)(i)(P) (1997 & Supp. 2002) (exempting "[all in-
vestigatory records of public bodies, with the exception of law enforcement agen-
cies, pertaining to possible violations of statute, rule or regulation other than
records of final actions taken provided that all records prior to formal notification
of violations or noncompliance shall not be deemed to be public").
99. R.I GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) (West 2003) (exempting "[aill records
which are identifiable to an individual applicant for benefits, client, patient, stu-
dent, or employee").
100. Rake, 452 A.2d at 1148.
101. Id. Despite the fact that the complainants' and the police officers' identi-
ties were redacted, the City continued to argue that the documents should be with-
held from public inspection because "the facts set forth in each report could be
matched with newspaper accounts of the incident that gave rise to the complaint."
Id. at 1149. The end result, the City claimed, "would be the identification of the
parties involved." Id. While acknowledging the City's concern, the Rhode Island
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Many years later, the holding in Rake was applied in Direct
Action for Rights and Equality (DARE) v. Gannon,10 2 where simi-
lar records spanning from 1986 through September 17, 1993 were
requested.10 3 After considering the same identifiable records ex-
emption and the same non-final investigatory records exemption
as set forth in Rake, the DARE court reached a similar result, con-
cluding that "records that do not specifically identify individuals
and that represent final action" must be disclosed. 10 4
The supreme court's latest police records case, however, offers
a variation on Rake and DARE. In Robinson v. Malinoff,'05 a local
newspaper, The Newport Daily News, was investigating alleged on-
duty misconduct involving a police officer. In conjunction with its
reporting, the newspaper requested "all reports of investigations
concerning" that particular officer.10 6 After the motion justice de-
clared the requested reports public, an appeal ensued where the
Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed on unrelated procedural
grounds.' 0 7 Although unnecessary to its disposition, the supreme
Supreme Court rejected this argument and concluded that "on balance the public's
right to know outweighs such a possibility." Id.
102. 713 A.2d 218 (R.I. 1998).
103. Four categories of Providence Police Department records were sought: (1)
every "Providence Police Civilian Complaint report" filed from 1986 through Sep-
tember 1993; (2) a listing of all investigation findings conducted by the Bureau of
Internal Affairs regarding all "Providence Police Civilian Complaint reports" from
1986 through September 1993; (3) all reports made by the Providence Police De-
partment hearing officers concerning their findings related to the "Providence Po-
lice Civilian Complaints" from 1986 through September 1993; and (4) reports on
all disciplinary action taken as a result of the hearing officers' recommendations
from 1986 through September 1993. Id. at 220.
104. Id. at 224.
105. 770 A.2d 873 (R.I. 2001).
106. Id. at 874. According to the supreme court's opinion, The Newport Daily
News reported that a college student complained to police that an officer had sexu-
ally assaulted her. Id. at 874 n.1. The allegations were considered by a Newport
grand jury, which did not return an indictment. Id.
107. Id. The Newport Daily News, through its publisher, Edward A. Sherman
Publishing Company (Sherman) intervened in this case. Id. at 875. Sherman an-
swered Robinson's complaint and filed a cross-claim against the City of Newport.
Id. In its motion for summary judgment, however, Sherman moved "in its favor
and against plaintiff Ernest Robinson." Id. The supreme court's opinion empha-
sizes that Sherman "did not file for summary judgment on its cross-claim against
the [C]ity, the sole custodian of the records being sought." Id. This failure to file
for summary judgment against the City, the sole custodian of the requested
records, was dispostive. Id. at 876-77. In particular, the supreme court noted that
"[tihe APRA only creates a cause of action for an individual or entity denied access
to records maintained by a public body against the public body that is the custo-
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court did provide clear guidance on the merits of the APRA issue.
In particular, the court noted that the plain language of the identi-
fiable records exemption "expresses the Legislature's clearly stated
intention to exempt from public disclosure those records concern-
ing a particular and identifiable individual." 08
The supreme court's three police record cases should not be
read as inconsistent despite the fact that Rake and DARE con-
cerned police misconduct records deemed public, while Robinson
concerned police misconduct records, which the supreme court
strongly suggested fall outside the public domain. Instead, Robin-
son exemplifies the fact specific nature of the APRA. In particular,
Rake and DARE concerned alleged police misconduct records span-
ning a seven year period, while Robinson examined the same type
of record, but identifiable to one particular person.' 0 9 Although
addressing the issue only in dicta, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court recognized the Robinson records were not susceptible to re-
daction in the same manner as the Rake and DARE documents,
and therefore, could not be disclosed without contravening section
38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I).1 0
3. Financial Records
In Charlesgate Nursing Center v. Bordeleau,111 a local union
embroiled in a labor dispute requested from the Department of
Health a financial document known as the BM-64 Report, which
was primarily designed to establish the appropriate state reim-
bursement rate for Medicaid services to respective nursing facili-
dian of the records." Id. at 876. Since Sherman requested summary judgment
against Robinson, and not the City, "relief was not available because Robinson was
not the custodian of the records sought." Id. at 876-77.
108. Id. at 877.
109. Compare Rake v. Gorodetsky, C.A. No. 81-1222, at 2 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug.
3, 1981) (stating that the plaintiff requested "every Providence Police Department
Hearing Officers' report on civilian complaints on record with the Providence Po-
lice Department from the year 1973 to [June 19801"), and Direct Action for Rights
& Equal. v. Gannon, 713 A.2d 218, 220 (R.I. 1998) (stating that the plaintiff re-
quested documents relating to civilian complaint process from 1986 to September
1993), with Robinson v. Malinoff, 770 A.2d 873, 874 (R.I. 2001) (stating that a
newspaper requested "all reports of investigations concerning" a particular police
officer).
110. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) (1997 & Supp. 2002); see also supra
notes 71, 75, 84, and accompanying text.
111. 568 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1990).
2003] AN APPLICATION GONE AWRY
ties. 112 Following the union's APRA request, the affected medical
facility, Charlesgate Nursing Center (Charlesgate), filed for injunc-
tive and declaratory relief, attempting to block disclosure of the
report. 113 A superior court trial justice disagreed and ruled that
after redacting some exempt personal information, the BM-64 Re-
port constituted a public record and must be disclosed." 4
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed, stressing the APRA's
stated purpose and the public oversight function to conclude that it
is "reasonably clear that the expenditure of $118 million of public
funds in a fiscal year is a matter that pertains to the policy-making
responsibilities of government."" 15 In doing so, the supreme court
recognized that "the public interest in these reports of expenditure
and income must be presumed to be both keen and continuous." 16
The justices continued:
It was obviously the intent of the Legislature that there be a
role for public oversight in order to make certain that both
the director and the providers were carrying out their respec-
tive obligations. It could only have been such a motivation
that caused the State of Rhode Island and the overwhelming
majority of the other states to have enacted freedom-of-infor-
112. Id. at 776.
113. Id. In a subsequent case, Rhode Island Federation of Teachers v. Sundlun,
595 A.2d 799 (R.I. 1991), a similar so-called reverse APRA lawsuit was brought to
block revealing records relating to special pension benefits authorized by the Gen-
eral Assembly. In Sundlun, the supreme court affirmed the trial justice's decision
and concluded that "[o portion of the [APRA] purports to provide a remedy for a
person or an entity that seeks to prevent disclosure." Id. at 801. The supreme
court continued, "[olur statute, like the Federal FOIA statute, is directed solely
toward requiring disclosure by public agencies and does not provide a reverse rem-
edy to prevent disclosure." Id. at 803. Although the Sundlun court acknowledged
it had been previously confronted with an attempt to prevent disclosure of finan-
cial information in Charlesgate Nursing Center v. Bordeleau, 568 A.2d 775 (R.I.
1990), the supreme court observed that "neither party [in that case] raised the
issue concerning whether APRA provided a remedy to compel nondisclosure in the
event that a public official or body was about to disclose material that might be
entitled to an exemption under the provisions of § 38-2-2." Id. at 801-02. Conse-
quently, Sundlun represents the first and only time the supreme court has ex-
amined this issue. Id. at 802.
114. Charlesgate Nursing Ctr., 568 A.2d at 776.
115. Id. at 777. On appeal, Charlesgate Nursing Center argued, inter alia, that
the BM-64 Report was exempt from disclosure by virtue of the identifiable records
exemption. Id. The supreme court concluded that this exemption was rendered
"noncontroversial by the deletion of [identifiable information]." Id.
116. Id.
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mation laws as well as the Freedom of Information Act
adopted by the Congress of the United States." 7
Charlesgate contains among the strongest disclosure language
written in any of the supreme court's APRA opinions and demon-
strates the court's conviction that enhanced public oversight, par-
ticularly with respect to financial expenditures, was precisely the
intent of the APRA.' 18 This oversight function was deemed so vital
that the supreme court rejected Charlesgate's argument that it
had a subjective expectation to privacy. 119 However, in the court's
next financial records case, the subjective expectations of privacy
were not dismissed.
In Providence Journal Co. v. Convention Center Authority,120
the supreme court examined a request to the Convention Center
Authority seeking various financial records related to a Mobil Ce-
lebrity Golf Invitational Tournament (golf tournament) and a Ver-
razano Day Banquet (banquet). Among the documents requested
were the signed contracts for the banquet and the golf tournament,
as well as records concerning the negotiations leading to the final-
ized agreements. 121 Citing the trade secrets and commercial or fi-
nancial information exemption, 122  the Convention Center
Authority denied the APRA request, a decision that a motion jus-
tice upheld.123 An appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court
ensued.124
117. Id.
118. See id. at 777-78 ("In these days of enhanced public participation in gov-
ernment, it has obviously been a legislative consensus that documents possessed
by public bodies in the course of their supervisory activities should generally be
made public unless specifically exempted in the relevant act.").
119. Id. at 777 ("We also reject the argument that the subjective desire for con-
fidentiality on the part of Charlesgate or any similar personal expectation should
overcome the public interest in knowing that its tax dollars are being appropri-
ately expended and that its public agencies are properly supervising that
expenditure.").
120. 774 A.2d 40 (R.I. 2001).
121. Id. at 43.
122. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(4)(i)(B) (1997 & Supp. 2002) (exempting
"Itirade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person,
firm, or corporation which is of a privileged or confidential nature").
123. Convention Ctr. Auth., 774 A.2d at 44.
124. Id. at 43-44.
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Relying upon federal precedent, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court articulated a two-prong test.125 The first prong addresses
commercial or financial information that is required to be provided
to the government. 126 With respect to this prong, documents are
exempt if disclosure would be likely "(1) to impair the
[g]overnment's ability to obtain necessary information in the fu-
ture; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of
the person from whom the information was obtained." 27 The sec-
ond prong provides that when commercial or financial information
is voluntarily provided to the government, that information is ex-
empt from disclosure if the records are "of a kind that would cus-
tomarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it
was obtained."128
125. Id. at 47 ("We agree with the holding in Critical Mass and its progeny and
adopt the test set forth therein, including the protection afforded to commercial
and financial information the provider would not customarily release to the pub-
lic." (citing Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d
871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1992))).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. Although the Convention Center Authority's second prong appears to
rely heavily upon one's subjective expectations, the supreme court's opinion fore-
warns that without legislative interaction, future documents may have to be dis-
closed even to the fiscal disadvantage of the State's competitive position or other
parties. See id. at 50 n.7 ("We recognize that this holding may have an adverse
impact on the Authority's competitiveness because its privately owned competitors
are not required to make public their contracts and presumably the prices charged
for the use of their facilities. However, the resolution of this issue rests with the
General Assembly and not this Court."); see also Cahill v. Hous. Auth., 2000 Op.
R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 00-09 (May 22, 2000) (unofficial finding) (requesting competi-
tor's bid submitted pursuant to sealed bidding process), available at http://
www.riag.state.ri.us/access/docs/prOO-09.htm. Other states have promulgated ex-
emptions to address the concerns expressed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(9)(A) (Supp. 2002) (exempting "[flies
which, if disclosed, would give advantage to competitors or bidders"); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 1-210(5)(B) (West Supp. 2000) (exempting "[c]ommercial or financial infor-
mation given in confidence"); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(1)(g) (Michie 1999) (exempt-
ing the "disclosure of the trade secrets or information [where disclosure] may cause
competitive harm"); IowA CODE § 22.7(6) (1998) (exempting "[reports to govern-
mental agencies which, if released, would give advantage to competitors and serve
no public purpose"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712.05(3) (1999) (exempting "proprietary
or commercial information which if released would give advantage to business
competitors and serve no public purpose"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-304(2)(a)
(Supp. 2000) (exempting "commercial information or non-individual financial in-
formation obtained from a person if disclosure of the information could reasonably
be expected to result in unfair competitive injury to the person submitting the
information").
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Applying the voluntary disclosure prong, the supreme court
concluded that the "documents regarding negotiations that led to
the booking of the event" fell squarely within section 38-2-2(4)(i)(B)
of the Rhode Island General Laws. 129 On the other hand, the court
concluded that "[olnce the negotiations are solidified into a final
agreement between the parties that agreement, or at least portions
of the agreement, should then be available to the public pursuant
to APRA."130
The identifiable record, police record, and financial record cat-
egories demonstrate the fact specific analysis for every APRA re-
quest. At first blush, the supreme court's conclusions in Rake and
DARE that redacted police investigation documents must be dis-
closed may seem inconsistent with Robinson's holding that those
investigation reports are exempt en toto. Furthermore, Charles-
gate Nursing Center's rejection of a subjective privacy interest may
seem at odds with the Convention Center Authority's heavy reli-
ance upon a subjective test. However, the supreme court's APRA
precedent recognizes "a rule . . . that permits the disclosure of
records that do not specifically identify individuals and that re-
present final action."13 '
129. Convention Ctr. Auth., 774 A.2d at 48. The Convention Center Authority
provided six affidavits, which collectively detailed what the affiants believed "to be
the anticompetitive effects of publicly disclosing the information sought by the
Journal." Id. at 44. Furthermore, according to the supreme court's opinion, each
affidavit concluded that "the information requested by the Journal contained con-
fidential commercial and financial information of a sort that is not typically shared
with the public." Id.
130. Id. at 50. With respect to the final contract, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court again referenced federal case law for the proposition that "no contract could
be exempted from FOIA in its entirety." Id. (citing Piper & Marbury L.L.P. v.
United States Postal Serv., No. CIV.A. 99-2383, 2001 WL 214217, at *4 (D.D.C.
Mar. 6, 2001)). The court added, however, that "[olbviously, if the agreement in-
cludes confidential or privileged financial information of the customer, such as in-
surance or financing consideration and profit projections, and is segregable, that
limited information is subject to redaction." Id. Upon remand, the trial justice re-
dacted from the final contract, among other information, the final prices, rates,
and references to complimentary rooms or services. This decision is on appeal to
the Rhode Island Supreme Court. See Rule 12A Statement of Appellant, Provi-
dence Journal Co. v. Convention Ctr. Auth., C.A. No. PC 97-2985 (R.I. Super. Ct.
1997) (No. 02-0132).
131. Direct Action for Rights & Equal. v. Gannon, 713 A.2d 218, 224 (R.I. 1998).
This rule is consistent with the FOIA's central purpose, and by extension the
APRA's central purpose. See supra Part I.
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B. The Access to Public Records Act and the Rhode Island
Administrative Agencies
Despite the great weight of legislative and judicial authority,
Rhode Island administrative agencies continue to be burdened
with requests that exceed. the APRA's central purpose, and that
sometimes even exceed their resources. In fact, a sizeable number
of APRA requests have little or no relation to the public's oversight
function, but instead promote other values, such as obtaining
records to learn about individual citizens or to advance a private
interest to the detriment of the public at large.
1. Document Requests Unrelated to Government Activity
In one high-profile situation, a North Kingstown motor-vehicle
accident claimed the life of a fifteen-year-old girl. 132 Five other
juveniles were also involved in the accident, one of whom was crim-
inally charged. 133 After The Providence Journal's request to ob-
tain the identities of the five surviving juveniles was denied by the
North Kingstown Police Department, the newspaper filed a law-
suit in the Rhode Island Superior Court seeking, inter alia, "the
names of the occupants of [the] vehicle." 134
Reporting on its own lawsuit, The Providence Journal noted
that the early morning single motor-vehicle accident raised "ques-
tions as to why the teens were out so late and where they were
going."' 35 The Providence Journal added that its effort "to find out
more about the tragedy, including the names of the other teenag-
ers in the car" had been denied' 36 and that "teenage driving has
become an issue of great public concern."1 37 However, nowhere in
its newspaper article, or in its subsequent superior court com-
plaint, did The Providence Journal Company explain how disclos-
132. Paul Davis, Teen Killed in Crash Freshman at La Salle, PROVIDENCE J.,
June 5, 2001, at Al.
133. Elizabeth Abbott, Journal Sues Police to Obtain Report of Fatal Car
Crash, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 30, 2001, at B3; see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-64(a) (West
2003) ("All police records relating to the arrest, detention, apprehension, and dis-
position of any juveniles shall be kept in files separate and apart from the arrest
records of adults and shall be withheld from public inspection.").
134. See Complaint at 1, Providence Journal Co. v. North Kingstown Police
Dep't, C.A. No. 2001-0442 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2001).
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ing the accident's details, or revealing the identities of the
juveniles, relate to the operation of government. 138
In another situation, an investigation company requested from
the Division of Motor Vehicles copies of drivers' license photo-
graphs, 139 and then one year later, sought the social security num-
bers of drivers. 140 After being denied access to both requests, the
investigation company filed complaints with the Department of At-
torney General. 141 In its finding, the Department of Attorney Gen-
eral concluded that the disclosure of drivers' license photographs
and social security numbers would constitute "an unwarranted in-
vasion of personal privacy" and would not advance the intent of the
APA142
138. Id. See generally Complaint, Providence Journal Co. v. North Kingstown
Police Dep't, C.A. No. 2001-0442 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2001). Nineteen months
after filing its lawsuit, The Providence Journal agreed to dismiss any and all
claims against the North Kingstown Police Department without any costs or sanc-
tions. See Dismissal Stipulation, Providence Journal Co. v. North Kingstown Po-
lice Dep't, C.A No. 2001-0442 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2003).
139. See Marrier v. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 1994 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 94-03
(Apr. 1, 1994) (unofficial opinion) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1994 Marrier
Opinion].
140. See Marrier v. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 1995 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 95-09
(Mar. 28, 1995) (unofficial opinion) (on file with author), available at http://www.
riag.state.ri.usaccess/docspr95-09.html [hereinafter 1995 Marrier Opinion].
141. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-8 (1997 & Supp. 2002) (providing that any per-
son denied the right to inspect a record of a public body may petition the chief
administrative officer of the public body for review, file a complaint with the De-
partment of Attorney General, or file a civil lawsuit in the superior court).
142. See 1995 Marrier Opinion, supra note 140; 1994 Marrier Opinion, supra
note 139. The type of information requested in the two Marrier APRA requests
does not differ materially from the information sought by Robert John Bardo when
he retained the services of a private detective to obtain the home address of Re-
becca Schaeffer, an aspiring actress. See Andrea Ford, Fan Convicted of Murder in
Actress's Slaying Trial: Judge Also Rules that the Obsessed Robert Bardo Lay in
Wait for Rebecca Schaeffer, Requiring a Sentence of Life in Prison Without the Pos-
sibility of Parole, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1991, at BI. Armed with Schaeffer's home
address, obtained from the California Department of Motor Vehicles, Bardo shot
and killed Schaeffer at her residence. See Rebecca Schaeffer's Murder: Things that
Went Wrong, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 1989, at B9 ("It is painfully self-evident that new
laws need to be immediately enacted to protect the privacy and safety of individu-
als by making it considerably more difficult for someone to obtain a person's home
address from the DMV or any other source in order to prevent future such trage-
dies."). As a result of this tragedy, the United States Congress enacted the
Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, which prohibits a state department of mo-
tor vehicles from knowingly disclosing personal information about an individual.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (West 2000); see also Angela R. Karras, Note, The Constitu-
tionality of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act: A Fork in the Information Access
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Although ultimately denied, other document requests seem-
ingly unrelated to governmental activities include: public employ-
ees' home addresses, 143 private citizens' home addresses,'" mug
shots, 45 motor-vehicle accident reports, 46 police investigation re-
ports relating to a self-inflicted fatal gunshot wound,' 47 identities
Road, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 125, 128-29 (1999). Section 27-49-3.1(b)(3) of the Rhode
Island General Laws prohibits the division of motor vehicles from disclosing "infor-
mation that identifies an individual, including an individual's photograph, social
security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5 digit
zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information, but does not
include information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver's status."
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-49-3.1(b)(3) (West 2003).
143. See Myers/Pawtucket Sch. Comm. v. R.I. Dep't of Ed., 1996 Op. R.I. Att'y
Gen. PR 96-11 (May 23, 1996) (unofficial finding) (requesting the names and home
addresses of all certified public school teachers who reside in Pawtucket), available
at http://www.riag.state.ri.us/access/docs/pr96-11u.html; Robinson v. Greenville
Pub. Library, 1994 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 94-24A (Dec. 19, 1994) (unofficial opin-
ion) (seeking home addresses of members of the Greenville Public Library) (on file
with author).
144. See Anderson v. Central Falls Police Dep't, 1998 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 98-
10 (Apr. 16, 1998) (unofficial finding) (requesting automobile accident reports from
the Central Falls Police Department) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1998 An-
derson Finding I]; Anderson v. Providence Police Dep't, 1998 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen.
PR 98-05 (Apr. 16, 1998) (unofficial finding) (requesting automobile accident re-
ports from the Providence Police Department) (on file with author) [hereinafter
1998 Anderson Finding II]; Anderson v. Pawtucket Police Dep't, 1998 Op. R.I. Att'y
Gen. PR 98-07 (Apr. 10, 1998) (unofficial finding) (requesting automobile accident
reports from the Pawtucket Police Department) (on file with author) [hereinafter
1998 Anderson Finding III].
145. See Setera v. City of Providence, 1995 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 95-29 (Sept.
28, 1995) (unofficial opinion) (requesting mug shot), available at http://www.riag.
state.ri.us/access/docs/pr95-29html.
146. See Gardner v. Westerly Police Dep't, 1995 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 95-10
(Mar. 31, 1995) (unofficial opinion) (requesting witness statements, a diagram, and
information from the injured party's daughter relating to a fatal motor-vehicle ac-
cident), available at http://www.riag.state.ri.us/access/docs/pr95-10.html; David-
son v. East Greenwich Police Dep't, 1995 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 95-08 (Mar. 9,
1995) (unofficial opinion) (requesting accident report, including a description of
how the accident occurred, the accident reconstruction report, the names of all oc-
cupants, and witness statements), available at http://www.riag.state.ri.us/access/
docs/pr95-08.html; see also Chappell v. West Warwick Police Dep't, 2000 Op. R.I.
Att'y Gen. PR 00-17 (July 18, 2000) (unofficial finding) (requesting accident scene
photographs from son's fatal motor-vehicle accident), available at http://www.riag.
state.ri.us/access/docs/prOO-17.html.
147. See Casey v. Johnston Police Dep't, 2002 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 02-02
(Mar. 21, 2002) (unofficial finding) (requesting access to investigation records of
suicide), available at http://www.riag.state.ri.us/access/2002/2002upr.html.
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of non-resident students attending a local school, 148 a letter dis-
cussing another person's medical treatment, 149 names and ad-
dresses of students delinquent on repaying student loans,' 50 and a
tax return.151 Particularly troubling are APRA requests by con-
victed criminals, 5 2 such as the APRA request made by a convicted
felon for personal information concerning an individual who testi-
fied against him in a criminal proceeding, 153 and another by an
148. See Ellis v. East Greenwich Sch. Dep't, 1994 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 94-12
(June 2, 1994) (unofficial opinion) (requesting access to the names of non-resident
students who attended the East Greenwich School during the 1992-93 school year
and the final amount of tuition payments made for each of those students) (on file
with author).
149. See Gormally v. Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation and Hosps., 1994 Op.
R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 94-26 (Nov. 10, 1994) (unofficial opinion) (requesting copies of
correspondence between Administrator for the Division and Executive Director of
mental health facility concerning resident of the facility) (on file with author).
150. See Derderian v. R.I. Higher Educ. Assistance Auth., 1995 Op. R.I. Att'y
Gen. PR 95-12 (Apr. 19, 1995) (unofficial opinion) (requesting a listing of the
names and addresses of all individuals who have been delinquent in paying their
student loans back to the government), available at http:l/www.riag.state.ri.us/ac-
cess/docs/pr95-12.html.
151. See Howard v. R.I. Estate Tax Div., 1998 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 98-14
(May 28, 1998) (unofficial finding) (requesting a copy of estate tax return for de-
ceased mother) (on file with author).
152. In 1992, inmate public records requests processed by the Department of
Corrections totaled more than 1.5 million copies. See James Thomas Snyder, Re-
stricting Prisoners' Freedom of Information - Balancing Inmate Rights and Public
Privacy Concerns, 2000 DET. C. L. REV. 765, 771 (2000). These requests required
twenty employees at a cost of $900,000 to process and were billed to the requesting
inmates at $216,603. Id. at 771-72. The Department of Corrections collected a to-
tal of $11,296. Id. Inmate requests also comprised at least 70% of the more than
800 public records requests to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in 1994,
id. at 776 n.59 (citing Halting Inmate Requests for Records Called Unfair, AUSTIN
AM.-STATEMANN, Feb. 10, 1995, at B3), and more than 90% of the more than 6,000
outstanding public records requests at the Federal Bureau of Prisons in 1999. Id.
at 787 n.140; see also Wichmann, supra note 6, at 1229 ("[Plrisoners are among the
most litigious classes of citizens in the country (citation omitted), and granting
their requests priority review without requiring some additional showing that the
requests are likely to uncover exculpatory information could have a crippling effect
on the efficient functioning of FOIA.").
153. See D'Amario v. Dep't of Admin., 1995 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 95-17 (May
2, 1995) (request included an accounting of time taken off from work to testify
against the requester, as well as the "results of aptitude tests, health checks, eye
exams, hearing tests, physical promotions, raises, bonuses, reprimands, job appli-
cations"), available at http://www.riag.state.ri.us/access/docs/pr95-17.html.
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inmate who sought the civil service test and "all other documents"
pertaining to a designated correctional officer.15 4
2. Document Requests to Advance a Private Interest
A far greater threat to the integrity of the APRA concerns the
increasingly prevalent practice of using the APRA to advance a pri-
vate interest or otherwise disrupt an agency's mission.155 Indeed,
these all-encompassing requests for public documents require pub-
lic bodies, both large and small, to re-allocate resources away from
other agency obligations. 156 While compliance with the APRA con-
stitutes part of an agency's obligations, one must consider whether
the General Assembly intended to require a public body to respond
within ten business days to a public records request that does not
advance the APRA's central purpose. 157
One glaring example concerned the State of Rhode Island's
landmark lawsuit against the lead paint industry. In March 2001,
one month prior to a superior court trial justice's denial of the de-
fendants' motion to dismiss the State's complaint,158 the United
States Chamber of Commerce' 59 made a public records request for
154. See Lewis v. Dep't of Corrections, 1994 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 94-25 (Nov.
7, 1994) (amended unofficial opinion) (requesting a copy of civil service test taken
by correctional officer) (on file with author).
155. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 15 (noting that the FOIA "is the Taj Mahal of
the Doctrine of Unanticipated Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit
Analysis Ignored"). This Article readily acknowledges that section 38-2-3(h) of the
Rhode Island General Laws provides that "[no public records shall be withheld
based on the purpose for which the records are sought" and this Article does not
suggest that the requester's intent should be considered in approving or denying a
public records request. Instead, this Article merely observes, perhaps contrary to
common belief, that some APRA request are made for a purpose other than ob-
taining the requested documents.
156. Id. at 19 ("It is not only a good way to get scads of useful information; it is
also a means of keeping the government's litigation team busy reviewing carloads
of documents instead of tending to the trial of the case. The story is told of a crimi-
nal defense lawyer who negotiated a favorable plea for his client by filing an oner-
ous FOIA request that would have taken weeks of the U.S. attorney's time.").
157. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-2-7 (West 2003) (requiring public bodies to grant
or deny access to requested documents within ten business days of the request,
subject to a twenty business day extension for "good cause").
158. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, C.A. No. 99-5226, 2001 WL 345830, at *1
(R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2001) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss).
159. Admittedly, the United States Chamber of Commerce is not a named de-
fendant in State v. Lead Industries Ass'n, id. at *1 n.1, but it is nonetheless appar-
ent that the Chamber of Commerce has a vested interest in the lawsuit's outcome.
The Chamber of Commerce proudly proclaims itself the "world's largest business
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sixty-four categories of lead paint-related documents. 160 The re-
federation representing more than three million businesses and organizations of
every size, sector and region." See Press Release, United States Chamber of Com-
merce, United States Chamber of Commerce Seeks Information About Milwau-
kee's Culpability on Lead Paint (July 21, 2000), at http://www.uschamber.com/
press/releases/2000/uly/00-117.html. Furthermore, when the State of Rhode Is-
land announced its decision to file its landmark lawsuit against the lead-paint in-
dustry, the Chamber of Commerce issued a press release "condemn[ing] Rhode
Island's decision to sue the former manufacturers of lead paint." See Press Release,
United States Chamber of Commerce, United States Chamber of Commerce Con-
demns Action Against Lead Paint Manufacturers (Oct, 14, 1999), at http://www.
uschamber.com/press/releases/1999/october/99-195.htm.
160. The United States Chamber of Commerce's APRA request provided, in rel-
evant part, that "[e]xcept as provided in a particular request, all records of any
kind from 1950 through [March 8, 20011, are requested. Where a request contains
a list of items, such list is by way of example and is not intended to be a limitation
on the scope of the request." Letter from James Wooton, President, United States
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, to Rhode Island Department of Attorney Gen-
eral 1 (Mar. 8, 2001) (requesting records relating to lead-based paint hazards) (on
file with author). The request listed the following categories verbatim:
1. All records relating to your policies and practices regarding the exami-
nation, screening, or diagnosis of children in the State of Rhode Island
for lead poisoning or lead exposure.
2. All records relating to your policies and practices regarding reports of
the results of the examination, screening, or diagnosis of children in
the State of Rhode Island for lead poisoning or lead exposure made to
the Rhode Island Department of Health, including sample medical re-
ports or forms for reporting.
3. All records relating to your policies and practices regarding the report-
ing of suspected or diagnosed cases of lead poisoning or lead exposure
to the Rhode Island Department of Health.
4. All records from the Rhode Island Department of Health Laboratory or
any other laboratory relating to all children in the State of Rhode Is-
land who have been diagnosed with lead poisoning or lead exposure.
5. All records, reports, or compilations of children in the State of Rhode
Island found to have lead poisoning or lead exposure.
6. All records relating to medical records or reports of children in the
State of Rhode Island found to have lead poisoning or lead exposure.
7. All records relating to your policies or practices regarding notifying the
parents or legal guardians of children who have been diagnosed with
lead poisoning or lead exposure.
8. All records relating to attempted or actual notification of the parents or
legal guardians of children diagnosed with lead poisoning or lead
exposure.
9. All other records relating to the screening of children in the State of
Rhode Island for lead poisoning or lead exposure not covered in Re-
quests Nos. 1-8 above.
10. All records relating to your current policies regarding the retention or
destruction of records of the type requested in Requests Nos. 1-9
above.
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11. All records relating to your policies and practices regarding the medi-
cal treatment and monitoring of children in the State of Rhode Island
diagnosed with lead poisoning or lead exposure.
12. All records relating to guidelines or policies of the Rhode Island De-
partment of Health Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program
regarding the medical treatment and monitoring of children in the
State of Rhode Island diagnosed with lead poisoning or lead exposure.
13. All records relating to the medical treatment and monitoring of indi-
vidual children in the State of Rhode Island diagnosed with lead
poisoning or lead exposure.
14. All records relating to and/or data compiled or stored using the meth-
ods of the Systematic Tracking of Elevated Lead Levels and Remedia-
tions ("STELLAR") developed by the Centers for Disease Control or
any other methods of keeping records regarding the diagnosis, medi-
cal treatment, and monitoring of children in the State of Rhode Island
diagnosed with lead poisoning or lead exposure.
15. All records relating to your policies or practices applicable in the
event the parent or guardian of a child diagnosed with lead poisoning
or lead exposure fails to seek treatment for that child.
16. All records relating to specific incidents where the parent or guardian
of a child in the State of Rhode Island diagnosed with lead poisoning
or lead exposure failed to seek treatment for that child.
17. All records relating to your policies or practices applicable in the
event health care providers fail to treat or monitor a child diagnosed
with lead poisoning or lead exposure in accordance with any rules or
regulations concerning lead poisoning prevention or any guidelines or
policies of the Rhode Island Health Department Childhood Lead
Poisoning Prevention Program.
18. All records relating to specific incidents where a health care provider
failed to treat or monitor a child diagnosed with lead poisoning or lead
exposure in accordance with the rules and regulations for lead poison-
ing prevention or any guidelines or policies of the Rhode Island
Health Department Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program.
19. All other records relating to the medical treatment and monitoring of
children in the State of Rhode Island diagnosed with lead poisoning or
lead exposure not covered in Request Nos. 11-18 above.
20. All records relating to your current policies regarding the retention or
destruction of records of the type requested in Requests Nos. 11-19
above.
21. All records relating to your polices or practices regarding the evalua-
tion and inspection of dwelling units, rooming units, structures or
parts thereof, buildings, premises or properties in the State of Rhode
Island for the presence of deteriorated paint, lead-based paint, lead-
contaminated dust, or any actual or potential lead-based paint hazard
including, but not limited to copies of all Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Lead Inspections, copies of all Limited Environmental Lead In-
spections and copies of all Environmental Lead Assessments, or
comparable inspection or assessments, however denominated.
22. All records relating to the evaluation or investigation of any dwelling,
dwelling unit, rooming unit, structure or part thereof, building, prem-
ises or property in the State of Rhode Island for the presence of deteri-
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quest was tendered to at least five state agencies and several City
orated paint, lead-based paint, lead-contaminated dust, or any actual
or potential lead-based paint hazard.
23. All records relating to the detection and/or reporting of deteriorated
paint, lead-based paint, lead-contaminated dust, or any actual or po-
tential lead-based paint hazard in any dwelling, dwelling unit, room-
ing unit, structure or part thereof, building, premises or property in
the State of Rhode Island.
24. All records relating to lead-based hazard reduction measures imple-
mented or to be implemented in any dwelling, dwelling unit, rooming
unit, structure or part thereof, building, premises or property in the
State of Rhode Island.
25. All records relating to complaints or notices submitted to your agency
alleging the presence of deteriorated paint, lead-based paint, lead-
contaminated dust, or any actual or potential lead-based paint hazard
in any dwelling, dwelling unit, rooming unit, structure or part
thereof, building, premises or property in the State of Rhode Island.
26. All records relating to complaints or notices filed with your agency
seeking the maintenance or repair of deteriorated paint, lead-based
paint, friction surfaces, impact surfaces, lead-contaminated dust or
any actual or potential lead-based paint hazard in any dwelling,
dwelling unit, rooming unit, structure or part thereof, building, prem-
ises or property in the State of Rhode Island.
27. All records relating to the actual or alleged violation of any statutes,
codes, rules, regulations, ordinances or orders pertaining to mainte-
nance, evaluation, reduction, interim controls, abatement or any
other procedure designed to reduce human exposure or likely expo-
sure to lead-based paint hazards in any dwelling, dwelling unit, room-
ing unit, structure or part thereof, building, premises or property in
the State of Rhode Island.
28. All other records relating to the evaluation of any dwelling, dwelling
unit, rooming unit, structure or part thereof, building, premises or
property in the State of Rhode Island for any actual or potential lead-
based hazard not covered in Requests Nos. 21-27 above.
29. All records relating to your current policies regarding the retention or
destruction of records of the type requested in Requests Nos. 21-28
above.
30. All records relating to your policies and practices regarding the train-
ing, certification and/or licensing of any person who performs lead-
based hazard evaluations.
31. All records relating to your policies and practices regarding the train-
ing, certification and/or licensing of any person who implements lead-
based hazard reduction measures.
32. All records relating to your policies and practices regarding the moni-
toring and supervision of the lead-based hazard evaluations per-
formed or lead-based hazard reduction measures implemented by
persons to whom licenses, certifications and/or permits were issued by
the Rhode Island Department of Health.
33. All records relating to complaints of negligent or otherwise improper
lead-based hazard evaluations or implementation of lead-based haz-
ard reduction measures in the State of Rhode Island.
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34. All records relating to any disciplinary action taken against any per-
son who performs lead-based hazard evaluations and/or implements
lead-based hazard reduction measures, including, but not limited to
any revocation, suspension, cancellation or denial of any certification
or license.
35. All records relating to your current policies regarding the retention or
destruction of records of the type requested in Requests Nos. 30-34
above.
36. All records relating to your policies or practices regarding the assess-
ment and/or selection of procedures for conducting lead-based hazard
evaluations of real property in the State of Rhode Island, including
but not limited to the methods for examining, sampling or testing
painted, varnished or other finished surfaces, water, interior dust, soil
or other materials that may contain lead.
37. All records relating to your policies and practices regarding the selec-
tion of lead-based hazard reduction measurers to be implemented in
real property in the State of Rhode Island, including but not limited to
methods of removing lead-based paint and lead-contaminated dust,
containing or encapsulating lead-based paint, replacing lead-painted
surfaces or fixtures, and cleaning, repairing and monitoring lead-
based paint hazards.
38. All records documenting the implementation of lead-based hazard re-
duction measures in real property in the State of Rhode Island.
39. All records relating to your policies and practices regarding the issu-
ance of permits, licenses or certifications to implement lead-based
hazard reduction measures in the State of Rhode Island.
40. All records relating to agreements between the State of Rhode Island
or the City of Providence and/or its subparts and any entity or person
regarding the implementation of lead-based hazard reduction mea-
sures in real property in the State of Rhode Island.
41. All records relating to your current polices regarding the retention or
destruction of records of the type requested in Requests Nos. 36-40
above.
42. All records relating to your policies and practices regarding the issu-
ance of orders or notices requiring the reduction or elimination of
lead-based paint hazards in the State of Rhode Island.
43. All records concerning your policies and practices relating to the en-
forcement of notices or orders requiring the reduction or elimination
of lead-based paint hazards, including but not limited to the issuance
and/or prosecution of citations of any person for non-compliance with
such notices or orders or for violations of applicable reduction
measures.
44. All records relating to any notice or order issued by the State of Rhode
Island or City of Providence requiring the reduction or elimination of
lead-based paint hazards.
45. All records relating to the actual enforcement of notices and/or orders
requiring the reduction or elimination of lead-based paint hazard in
the State of Rhode Island, including but not limited to records relat-
ing to the citation and/or prosecution of any person for non-compli-
ance with such notices and/or orders or for violations of applicable
reduction measures.
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46. All records relating to your polices and practices regarding the assess-
ment of civil or criminal penalties for non-compliance with statutes,
rules, regulations or ordinances regarding lead-based hazard evalua-
tion or reduction in the State of Rhode Island.
47. All records of assessments of civil or criminal penalties for non-com-
pliance with statutes, codes, rules, regulations, or ordinances regard-
ing evaluation or reduction in the State of Rhode Island.
48. All other records relating to the enforcement of statutes, codes, rules,
regulations, ordinances, notices or orders regarding evaluation or re-
duction in the State of Rhode Island not covered in Requests Nos. 42-
47 above.
49. All records relating to your current policies regarding the retention or
destruction of records of the type requested in Requests Nos. 42-48
above.
50. All records relating to communication, cooperation or collaboration
between the State of Rhode Island and/or the City of Providence and
any community based organization, non-profit organization, or other
private and/or public entity, including but not limited to the Child-
hood Lead Action Project, the HELP Lead Safe Center, and the
Greater Elmwood Neighborhood Housing Service, regarding lead-
based paint hazard, evaluation or reduction.
51. All records relating to any funding provided by the State of Rhode
Island or City of Providence to any community based organization,
non-profit organization, or other private and/or public entities, includ-
ing but not limited to the Childhood Lead Action Project and the
HELP Lead Safe Center, for lead-paint evaluation or reduction.
52. All records relating to funding provided by the State of Rhode Island
or the City of Providence to any individuals for lead-paint evaluation
or reduction.
53. All records relating to your current policies regarding the retention or
destruction of records of the type requested in Requests Nos. 50-52
above.
54. All records relating to any funding received by the State of Rhode Is-
land or City of Providence for evaluation or reduction.
55. All records relating to any appropriations or other funds the State of
Rhode Island and/or City of Providence made available to itself for
evaluation or reduction.
56. All records relating to any funding or appropriations for the Residen-
tial Rental Property Lead-Based Paint Hazard Control Pilot Project, if
any.
57. All records relating to your policies regarding the retention or de-
struction of records of the type requested in Requests Nos. 54-56
above.
58. All records relating to past, current, and estimated future expendi-
tures by the State of Rhode Island or City of Providence for evalua-
tion, reduction, screening, and medical treatment and/or ongoing care
of children diagnosed with lead poisoning or lead exposure.
59. All records relating to the past, current, and/or estimated future fi-
nancial cost to the State of Rhode Island or City of Providence of pro-
viding subsidies, grants, or any type of financial assistance to persons
or entities for evaluation, reduction, screening, and medical treat-
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of Providence departments and was so broad that it encompassed
any record relating to lead paint since 1950.
Collectively, the state agencies estimated that the search and
retrieval of the requested information would require approxi-
mately one-and-a-half million documents and consume 2,641
hours, or 377 workdays. 161 When apprised of the state agencies'
estimate that search, retrieval, and photocopying costs would ex-
ceed $250,000, and that prepayment was required, 162 the United
States Chamber of Commerce declined to pursue nearly all aspects
of its APRA request. The Chamber's own actions and statements
in this situation, as well as other circumstances, make it clear that
its APRA request was intended to intimidate the State into drop-
ping the lead paint lawsuit. 163
ment and/or ongoing care of children diagnosed with lead poisoning or
lead exposure.
60. All records relating to your current policies regarding the retention or
destruction of records of the type requested in Requests Nos. 58-59
above.
61. All records relating to the past and present policies or practices of the
State of Rhode Island or the City of Providence regarding the use of
lead, lead pigment, and/or lead paint in the State of Rhode Island or
City of Providence.
62. All records relating to your current policies regarding the retention or
destruction of records of the type requested in Requests No. 61 [sic]
above.
63. All records relating to the education of the general public, or any spe-
cific segments of the public, regarding lead poisoning or lead expo-
sure, evaluation and/or reduction.
64. All records relating to your current policies regarding the retention or
destruction of records of the type requested in Request No. 63 above.
Id. at 1-8.
161. See Letter from Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Corporation
(May 4, 2001) (on file with author); Letter from the Department of Human Services
(Apr. 27, 2001) (on file with author); Letter from the Department of Environmental
Management (Apr. 25, 2001) (on file with author); Letter from the Department of
Attorney General (Apr. 16, 2001); Letter from the Department of Health (Apr. 13,
2001) (on file with author).
162. See Smith v. Watch Hill Fire Dist., 1999 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 99-15 (Oct.
19, 1999) (unofficial finding) (noting that the APRA does not prohibit a public
agency from requiring pre-payment), available at http://www.riag.state.ri.us/ac-
cess/docs/pr99-15.html.
163. A subsequent Chamber of Commerce press release acknowledged that its
Rhode Island APRA request marked only the second time it relied upon a freedom
of information law "to give the public all the information necessary to assess
whether expensive, risky, and prolonged litigation is the way to solve these kinds
of [lead paint] problems." See Press Release, United States Chamber of Commerce,
U.S. Chamber Seeks Information About St. Louis Culpability on Lead Paint
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A year later, in March 2002, a voluminous APRA request was
forwarded to the Department of Attorney General at a time when
Attorney General Sheldon Whitehouse was vying for the Demo-
cratic gubernatorial nomination.164 The sixteen-category re-
quest1 65 required State personnel to forego other government
(Nov. 14, 2001), at http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases2001/november/01-
192.html [hereinafter St. Louis Press Release]. The first time the Chamber of
Commerce used a freedom of information law to obtain lead paint related docu-
ments occurred when a similarly onerous request was made to the City of Milwau-
kee - four days before its City Council was scheduled to vote on suing the lead
paint manufacturers. See Press Release, United States Chamber of Commerce,
United States Chamber of Commerce Seeks Information About Milwaukee's Cul-
pability on Lead Paint (July 21, 2000), at http/www.uschamber.com/pressre-
leases/2000/july/00-117.html. When Milwaukee officials failed to fulfill the public
records request within six weeks, the Chamber of Commerce sued "to compel com-
pliance." Press Release, United States Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Sues
Milwaukee for Stonewalling Lead Paint Records Request (Aug. 16, 2000), at httpi/
www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2000/augustOO-123.html. Subsequently, Mil-
waukee officials assembled the requested records, including eighty-five boxes from
its Department of Health; but, according to a City attorney, Chamber of Commerce
representatives "never came and looked at it." Peter B. Lord, U.S. Chamber Coun-
terattacks Lead-Paint Suit, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 29, 2001, at Al, available at 2001
WL 5382125 (quoting Attorney Linda Burke). Chamber of Commerce representa-
tives have credited their public records request as causing the City of Milwaukee
"to back down" from its planned lead paint lawsuit and as causing the City of Mil-
waukee to hold "off on pressing its suit." Id. (reporting the comments of Chamber
of Commerce Spokeswoman Linda Rozett and Chamber of Commerce Legal Insti-
tute Reform President James Wootton, respectively). The United States Chamber
of Commerce also filed a public records request with the City of St. Louis after that
City filed a lawsuit against lead paint manufacturers. See St. Louis Press Release,
supra note 163.
164. Presumably, the true intention of this APRA request was to advance one
candidate's campaign and/or to hinder another candidate's campaign. Notwith-
standing the APRA request itself, this situation exemplifies one way the APRA can
be applied to advance a private interest to the detriment of the public at large. For
example, consider an APRA request made to a political opponent that is so volumi-
nous that it has little chance of being fulfilled within the statutory timeframe. See
infra note 165. After the agency fails to respond within a timely manner, the inevi-
table complaint is filed with the Department of Attorney General or the Rhode
Island Superior Court, followed shortly by a newspaper headline that a particular
candidate is accused of violating the APRA. See Arruda v. Law Revision Office,
2001 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 01-04 (July 10, 2001) (unofficial finding) (APRA com-
plaint filed against House of Representatives Speaker John Harwood in June
2000, five months before November 2000 election, even though complainant ob-
tained records from the Office of Secretary of State in May 2000), available at
http://www.riag.state.ri.us/opinion/docs/advpr0l-04.htm.
165. At the time of the request, Attorney General Sheldon Whitehouse was one
of three candidates vying for the Democratic Party nomination for Governor of
Rhode Island. The requests stated:
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1. Please provide me with copies of all contracts with outside counsel ini-
tiated, renewed, amended, or extended by the Attorney General's office
from January 5, 1999 [the day Attorney General Sheldon Whitehouse's
Administration commenced] to the present.
2. Please provide me with copies of all reimbursement requests and travel
advance/payment requests submitted by Sheldon Whitehouse during
his term as Attorney General. This request includes copies of the origi-
nal receipts in addition to the request form or invoice submitted for
payment.
Letter to the Attorney General of Rhode Island, Public Records Request
#1 (Mar. 20, 2002) (on file with author);
[31 Copies of all correspondence between the Attorney General's Office
and Robert Goldberg, Thomas Hanley, Alan Goldman, Peter McGinn,
Patrick Lynch (after leaving the AG's Office), Casby Harrison, Richard
Licht, Lynda Barr, Eustace Pliakas, Lynda Izzo, Mary Smith, and
Gayle J. Wolf, regarding the state of Rhode Island's enforcement of
tobacco [] regulations; proposed new federal or state regulations or
legislation regarding tobacco; any litigation or proposed litigation in-
volving tobacco companies, including RJ Reynolds, Phillip Morris, and
US Smokeless Tobacco/UST.
[41 Copies of all correspondence between the Attorney General's Office
and Joseph Walsh, Casby Harrison, Richard Licht, Lynda Barr, Eus-
tace Pliakas, Lynda Izzo, Mary Smith, and Gayle J. Wolf, regarding
the state of Rhode Island's enforcement of insurance regulations; pro-
posed federal or state regulations or legislation regarding insurance;
any litigation or proposed litigation involving insurance-related busi-
nesses, including Blue Cross-Blue Shield, Care New England,
Harvard Pilgrim, Lifespan and United Healthcare.
[51 Copies of all correspondence between the Attorney General's Office
and Peter McGinn, Alan Goldman, Brian Goldman, Gerald Harring-
ton, John Hogan, Joseph Walsh, Casby Harrison, Richard Licht,
Lynda Barr, Eustace Pliakas, Lynda Izzo, Mary Smith, and Gayle J.
Wolf, regarding the state of Rhode Island's enforcement of liquor, beer
and wine regulations; proposed federal or state regulations or legisla-
tion regarding liquor, beer and wine; any litigation or proposed litiga-
tion involving liquor, beer and wine related businesses; any proposed
modifications to the state's drunk driving laws, including recent bills
in the state legislature regarding the lowering of the state's legal
blood-alcohol limit.
[61 Any correspondence between the Attorney General's Office and R.
Horan of the Horan Law Office, Joseph Walsh, Casby Harrison, Eus-
tace Pliakas, Lynda Izzo, Gayle J. Wolf, Richard Licht, Gerald Har-
rington, John Hogan, Brian Andrews, or Donald Sweitzer regarding
the expansion of gambling facilities, including any proposed or en-
acted increases in gambling machines or regarding the jurisdiction of
the State Lottery Commission.
[7] Any correspondence between the Attorney General's Office and Robert
Goldberg, Gerald Harrington or John Hogan regarding the state's liti-
gation against lead paint manufacturers.
Letter to the Attorney General of Rhode Island, Public Records Revised
Request #2 (Apr. 2, 2002) (on file with author);
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matters and to devote several hundred hours of government time
[8] Copies of documents that show annual conviction rates for all criminal
charges filed by the Attorney General's Office from 1991 to the pre-
sent. For each criminal offense tracked by the Attorney General's Of-
fice, please show the number of cases filed, the number of cases that
ended in a conviction, the number of cases that went to trial and the
number of cases that went to trial that ended in a conviction.
[9] Copies of documents that show the total number of civil environmen-
tal and consumer fraud case filed by the Attorney General's Office
from 1991 to the present, along with the number of cases that ended in
a penalty, the number of cases that went to trial and the number of
cases that went to trial that ended in a penalty.
[10] Copies of documents that show the case numbers and defendant
name for all murder charges filed by the Attorney General's Office
from January 5, 1999 to the present, and the disposition of each of
those cases (including the length of sentence).
[111 Copies of documents that show the case numbers and defendant
name for all criminal cases filed by the Attorney General's Office in
Gun Court from January 5, 1999 to the present, along with the dispo-
sition of each of those cases (including the length of sentence, amount
of fine, etc.).
[12] Copies of documents that show the case number and defendant name
for all other firearm charges filed by the Attorney General's Office
from January 5, 1999 to the present, along with the disposition of
each of those cases (including the length of sentence, amount of fine,
etc.).
[131 Copies of documents that show the case number and defendant name
for all domestic violence cases filed by the Attorney General's Office,
including the Domestic Violence/Sexual Assault Unit, from January
5, 1999 to the present, along with the disposition of each of those
cases (including the length of sentence, amount of fine, restitution,
etc.).
Letter to the Attorney General of Rhode Island, Public Records Request
#3 (Mar. 20, 2002) (on file with author);
[14] Documents that show all positions taken by the Attorney General's
Office on state, federal and municipal legislation since January 5,
1999. This includes any legislation drafted with the assistance of the
Attorney General's Office, any legislation sponsored by the Attorney
General's Office, any legislation otherwise supported, any legislation
opposed, and any testimony given by the Attorney General's Office in
favor or against legislation.
[151 Copies of all amicus curiae briefs filed or signed by the Attorney Gen-
eral's Office from January 5, 1999 to the present.
Letter to the Attorney General of Rhode Island, Public Records Request
#4 (Mar. 20, 2002) (on file with author).
[16] Copies of all opinions drafted by the Attorney General's Office from
January 5, 1999 to the present.
Letter to the Attorney General of Rhode Island, Public Records Request
#5 (Mar. 25, 2002) (on file with author).
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to search, retrieve, and photocopy documents, presumably to bene-
fit a political campaign. 166 Other requests are equally onerous.
For example, law firms and other commercial entities tender
open-ended or ongoing APRA requests to police departments for all
motor-vehicle accident reports, complete with the names, home ad-
dresses, and telephone numbers of injured passengers. 167 These
requests shed no light on government activities and instead are
arguably intended for solicitation of business. In another situa-
tion, during a one-month time period, a local water authority re-
ceived six separate APRA requests from one person, requiring an
estimated 132 hours of search and retrieval to locate 10,796
documents.1 68
Undoubtedly, in most cases, these records constituted public
records, but were sought to advance a private interest. However,
unlike other APRA requests, the issue confronted when a party
seeks public records to advance a private interest is the extent to
which Rhode Islanders' are willing to allow the APRA to be used
for a purpose outside its central purpose and to the public's detri-
ment. 169 As demonstrated by the United States Chamber of Com-
merce's APRA request, these types of all-encompassing requests
166. Section 38-2-4(b) of the Rhode Island General Laws permits a public body
to charge a maximum of fifteen dollars per hour, with the first hour free, for "a
search and retrieval." R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-2-4(b) (1997). Accordingly, although
Department of Attorney General personnel may have spent several hundred hours
on this APRA request, because the actual searching and retrieving for public
records consisted only of ninety-one hours, the search and retrieval charge was
limited to this aspect. See Letter from Michael W. Field, Special Assistant Attor-
ney General, Rhode Island Department of Attorney General (May 9, 2002) (on file
with author). This Article also notes that it cannot be independently confirmed
that the instant request was propounded "to benefit a political campaign." None-
theless, the focus of the requested documents, as well as the timing of the APRA
request to the Department of Attorney General, certainly could lead one to this
conclusion.
167. See, e.g., 1998 Anderson Finding I, supra note 144; 1998 Anderson Finding
II, supra note 144; 1998 Anderson Finding III, supra note 144.
168. See Letter to Board of Directors, Kent County Water Authority (Sept. 14,
2001) (on file with author); Letter to Board of Directors, Kent County Water Au-
thority (Aug. 31, 2001) (on file with author); Letter to Attorney Joseph J. McGair
(Aug. 26, 2001); Letter to Timothy J. Brown, P.E. General Manager/Chief Engi-
neer, Kent County Water Authority (Aug. 13, 2001) (on file with author); Letter to
Timothy J. Brown, P.E. General Manager/Chief Engineer, Kent County Water Au-
thority (Aug. 13, 2001) (on file with author).
169. See Cate et al., supra note 10, at 65 ("[T]he FOIA has been extended by
requesters, agencies, litigants, and courts far beyond its original purpose. Indeed,
the vast majority of requests under the Act seek no information about the activi-
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often require agencies to divert resources with little or no corre-
sponding benefit to the public.170
III. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES TO ACHIEVE THE ACCESS TO PUBLIC
RECORD ACT'S CENTRAL PURPOSE
A. The Balancing Test
The APRA has long been criticized for not containing a "bal-
ancing test" similar to that embodied within the FOIA. 171 Sup-
porters of such a test claim that "[t]he test is a balance.. . between
the public's right to know and the individual's right to privacy."172
The argument continues that "[without the balancing test, state
officials are left with little guidance when it comes to many aspects
of state government." 7 3  These contentions are seriously
misdirected.
As presently interpreted, the APRA already encompasses a
balancing test. 174 In fact, this balancing procedure was recognized
ties of the government, but rather information about business competitors, oppos-
ing parties in litigation, and the activities of other nongovernmental entities.").
170. One of the main reasons why an agency must reprioritize daily govern-
mental business in order to satisfy a public records request is because of the
APRA's timeframes. Regardless of how voluminous an APRA request may be, and
without consideration to the resources or mission of a public body, the APRA re-
quires that an agency respond to a request within ten business days, which can be
extended for "good cause" an additional twenty business days. R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-
2-7(a) (West 2003). After the twenty business day extension, the APRA does not
allow an agency to further extend the time to respond under any circumstances.
R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-2-7(b) (West 2003) ("Except that for good cause, this limit may
be extended for a period not to exceed thirty (30) business days."). Cf. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (a)(6)(C) (1996) ("If the Government can show exceptional circumstances ex-
ist and that the agency is exercising due diligence in responding to the request, the
court may retain jurisdiction and allow the agency additional time to complete its
review of the records.").
171. See Bruce Landis, Open Records Bills 'On Ice for this Year,' PROVIDENCE J.,
Apr. 1, 1999, at B1; Christopher Rowland, Almond Orders Disclosure of Union
Records After Firestorm, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 20, 1999, at Al; Bruce Landis, Advo-
cates of Open Government See Progress on Records Law, PROVIDENCE J., July 19,
1998, at A15 (hereinafter Progress on Records Law].
172. Landis, Progress on Records Law, supra note 171, at A15.
173. Rowland, supra note 171, at AS.
174. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Some may contend that the
decision in Providence Journal Co. v. Convention Center Authority, 774 A.2d 44
(R.I. 2001), overruled the balancing test articulated in Kane and reaffirmed in
DARE. This argument is premised upon the Rhode Island Supreme Court's obser-
vation that it "has previously held that applicability of APRA to records held by a
public body is not determined by a balancing test. Simply put, the records are
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in Providence Journal Co. v. Kane, where The Providence Journal
was denied records pertaining to individual state employees.' 75 A
superior court trial justice ruled that the requested documents "re-
lat[ed] to identifiable individuals" and, therefore, were exempt
from public disclosure. 176 The Providence Journal Company ap-
pealed the trial justice's decision, and in its brief to the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court, argued that based upon the APRA's stated
purpose "the Legislature clearly recognized the need to balance the
legitimate, competing interest of disclosure and privacy."' 77 In
other words, despite the applicability of the identifiable records ex-
emption, the newspaper urged the supreme court to remand the
matter to the superior court in order to balance the competing in-
terests and to find "some or all of the [riecords . ..subject to
disclosure."' 7 8
The supreme court rejected The Providence Journal Com-
pany's argument that the trial justice erred in Kane by not per-
forming the balancing test, but expressly recognized its argument
subject to public disclosure unless they fall within one of the enumerated excep-
tions contained in APRA." Id. at 46. Any argument that the balancing test was
overruled in Convention Center Authority is misguided. The Convention Center
Authority court did not apply the balancing test analysis itself, and accordingly,
never reached this issue. Instead, the supreme court concluded that the balancing
test-type analysis performed by the motion justice was in error. See id. at 45-46
(noting that "the hearing justice['s finding] . . .that the release of the requested
records would hurt the Authority's competitive advantage and conflict with its
statutory mission to operate as profitably as possible" has "no bearing on whether
records held by a public body are subject to disclosure under APRA"). Specifically,
the supreme court observed the motion justice's determination that the requested
documents were exempt from disclosure because they contained "information that
people presume will be kept confidential when they are engaging in the negotiat-
ing process." Id. at 44. This determination by the motion justice, rather than de-
termining whether the affected documents fell within the ambit of any enumerated
exemptions, conflicts with Kane and DARE wherein the supreme court opined that
"[any balancing of interests arises only after a record has first been determined to
be a public record." Id. at 46 (emphasis added) (quoting Providence Journal Co. v.
Kane, 577 A.2d 661, 663 (R.I. 1990)). Accordingly, the supreme court's admonition
relates to the motion justice's decision to proceed directly to the balancing test,
rather than first determine the applicability of the enumerated exemptions.
175. See Providence Journal Co. v. Kane, 577 A.2d 661, 663 (R.I. 1990).
176. Id. at 662.
177. Appellant's Brief at 4-5, Providence Journal Co. v. Kane, 577 A.2d 661
(R.I. 1990) (No. 89-317A).
178. Id. at 19.
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that the APRA does contain a balancing test.179 Specifically, the
supreme court stated:
There is no public interest to be weighed in disclosure of non-
public records. Consequently, the trial court's "failure to bal-
ance interest" does not in any way constitute an error of law.
Any balancing of interests arises only after a record has first
been determined to be a public record. 180
179. Kane, 577 A.2d at 663.
180. Id. (emphasis added). It may seem inconsistent that a pro-disclosure law
like the APRA requires a balancing test for records that do not fall within an ex-
emption in order to determine if the document should be exempt due to a privacy
interest, but does not require a balancing test for records that do fall within an
exemption in order to assess whether the document should be disclosed due to the
public's interest. However, a subjective balancing test should not be permitted to
nullify a legislative determination that documents falling within an enumerated
exemption are not public records, or stated another way, "[tihere is no public inter-
est to be weighed in disclosure of nonpublic records." Direct Action for Rights &
Equal. v. Gannon, 713 A.2d 218 (R.I. 1998) (quoting Providence Journal Co. v.
Kane, 577 A.2d 661, 663 (R.I. 1990)); see also United States Dep't of Justice v.
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 776 (1989) ("Our cases
provide support for the proposition that categorical decisions may be appropriate
and individual circumstances disregarded when a case fits into a genus in which
the balance characteristically tips in one direction."). Furthermore, the present
balancing test recognizes that it is impossible for the General Assembly to legislate
every permutation of any document maintained by a governmental entity. For ex-
ample, the Rhode Island General Laws do not address whether the identity of an
adult victim of sexual assault can be publicly released. Nonetheless, after balanc-
ing the public interest in disclosure versus the privacy interest of the adult victim,
there is almost universal agreement that disclosing the identity of an adult sexual
assault victim would unduly infringe upon the victim's privacy interests without
advancing the public interest. Without a balancing test to consider this type of
factual permutation, as well as a myriad of other issues not expressly addressed
within the General Laws, the APRA would require disclosing the adult victim's
identity. In February 2003, it was reported that legislation would be introduced
during the 2003 legislative session to make clear that "'any record not specifically
exempt' from disclosure, should be made available upon request." Katherine
Gregg, Irons Bucks Murphy, Favors Release of Employee Records, PROVIDENCE J.,
Feb. 5, 2003 at A5, available at 2003 WL 7054065. If such legislation was enacted,
it would almost certainly overrule the supreme court's balancing test articulated in
Kane and DARE, and would place an affirmative duty upon the General Assembly
to exempt expressly documents from public disclosure. For example, consider just
one type of document, a police record. Should the proposed amendment pass, the
General Assembly would place itself in a position of determining what information
might possibly be contained within a police report and assess whether such infor-
mation should be a public record. Home addresses; home telephone numbers; the
identities of witnesses, including juveniles; the names of crime victims, including
adult victims of sexual assault; and mug shots represent only the beginning of the
issues that must be considered with respect to police records. The same type of
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The court reaffirmed the balancing test in DARE.' 8 '
Accordingly, pursuant to Kane and DARE, if a requested re-
cord falls within one of the twenty-three enumerated exemptions,
that document is exempt from public disclosure and no balancing
test is performed.' 8 2 If a requested record does not fall within the
enumerated exemptions, the document is presumed a public re-
cord, but a balancing test is performed to determine whether the
individual's privacy interest outweighs the public's interest in dis-
closure.183 If an individual's privacy interest outweighs the pub-
lic's disclosure interest, the document (or portions thereof) are
exempt from public disclosure.' 8 4
The "balancing test" amendment arguments are faulty on
other grounds. Notwithstanding the supreme court's recognition
that a balancing test must be performed on otherwise public
records, the APRA already contains two provisions that require a
balancing of interests. In particular, section 38-2-2(4)(i)(D) of the
Rhode Island General Laws provides that all records maintained
by law enforcement agencies for criminal law enforcement must be
disclosed, unless the document falls within one of six categories,
including where disclosure "could reasonably be expected to consti-
tute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."18 5 Another ex-
ample is section 38-2-2(4)(i)(F), which exempts "[slcientific and
technological secrets and the security plans of military and law en-
forcement agencies, the disclosure of which would endanger the
public welfare and security."'s6
When supporters suggest that the APRA contain a balancing
test similar to the FOIA, presumably these arguments refer to
speculative analysis must also be conducted concerning all other types of docu-
ments government may possess.
181. Direct Action for Rights & Equal. v. Gannon, 713 A.2d at 225 ("We also
reject DARE's contention that if any document falls within the APRA's enumer-
ated exceptions ... the terms of the APRA[ ] require the administrative agency to
demonstrate that the relevant privacy interests outweigh the public's right to ac-
cess the records. In Kane we rejected a similar argument, stating that "'[tihere is
no public interest to be weighed in disclosure of nonpublic records .... Any bal-
ancing of interests arises only after a record has been determined to be a public
record.'" (quoting Kane, 577 A.2d at 663)).
182. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Direct Action for Rights &
Equal., 713 A.2d at 225; Kane, 577 A.2d at 663.
183. LYNCH, supra note 54.
184. See supra note 59.
185. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(4)(i)(D)(c) (West 2003).
186. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(4)(i)(F) (West 2003) (emphasis added).
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amending the identifiable records exemption to contain language
similar to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), which allows federal agencies to ex-
empt from public disclosure "personnel and medical files and simi-
lar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."18 7 The trouble with
187. 5 U.S.C § 552(b)(6) (1996) (emphasis added). Cf. R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-2-
2(4)(i)(A)(I) (West 2003) (exempting "[aill records which are identifiable to an indi-
vidual applicant for benefits, client, patient, student, or employee"). Balancing
test amendments to section 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) of the Rhode Island General Laws
have been proposed in nearly every legislative year since at least 1998. See H.
6956, 2002 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2002) (amending R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-2-
2(4)(i)(A)(I) to exempt all records "protected by a client/attorney or doctor/patient
relationship, and records reflecting personal or medical or psychological facts, per-
sonal finances, welfare, employment security, student performance, or information
in personnel files maintained to hire, evaluate, promote, or discipline any em-
ployee of a public body where the disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of privacy" (emphasis added)); H. 5819, 2002 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I.
2002) (employs identical language to H. 6956, 2002 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I.
2002)); H. 5944, 2001 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2001) ("The intent of this sec-
tion is to recognize that there exists a general presumption that a record is public
unless there is a specific statutory exemption or privilege applicable to that record.
In determining whether all or any portion of a record is a 'public' record, the fact
finder must balance the need for public accountability with the need to protect
both public safety and individual rights to privacy."); H. 5819, 1999 Gen. Assem.,
Jan. Sess. § 38-2-2(4)(iv)(A)(I) (R.I. 1999) (employs identical language to H. 6956,
2002 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2002)); H. 5950, 1999 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess.
§ 38-2-2(4)(iv)(A)(I) (R.I. 1999) (creating exemption for "[riecords relating to an in-
dividual in any files including information relating to personal finances, welfare,
employment security, student performance, or information in personnel files main-
tained to hire, evaluate, promote, or discipline any employee of a public body where
the disclosure would constitute an 'unwarranted invasion of personal privacy'")
(emphasis added); S. 0336, 1999 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. § 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) (R.I.
1999) (exempting applicable records only where "the disclosure would constitute
an 'unwarranted invasion of personal privacy'"); S. 2652, 1998 Gen. Assem., Jan.
Sess. § 38-2-2(4)(iv)(A)(I) (R.I. 1998) (exempting applicable records only "where the
subject's personal right to privacy outweighs the public interest in access to those
records or the records are otherwise exempted from disclosure by statute"); S.
2393, 1998 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. § 38-2-2(4Xiv)A)(I) (R.I. 1998) (exempting ap-
plicable records only "where the subject's personal right to privacy outweighs the
public interest in access to those records or the records are otherwise exempted
from disclosure by statute"); H. 7888, 1998 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. § 38-2-
2(4)(iv)(A)(I) (R.I. 1998) (exempting applicable records only "where the subject's
personal right to privacy outweighs the public interest in access to those records or
the records are otherwise exempted from disclosure by statute"); H. 6022, 1997
Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. § 38-2-2(d)(1) (R.I. 1997) (exempting applicable records
only "where the subject's personal right to privacy clearly outweighs the public
interest in access to those records or the records are otherwise exempted from dis-
closure by statute") (emphasis added); S. 0395, 1997 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. § 38-
2-2(d)(1) (R.I. 1997) (exempting applicable records only "where the subject's per-
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amending the identifiable records exemption to include a balanc-
ing test similar to section 552(b)(6) is that the state and federal
laws are not compatible.' 88
The class of documents exempted pursuant to section 552(b)(6)
is narrow and carefully defined to include only "personnel and
medical files and similar files."18 9 As a result, the balancing test
applies only to this narrow class of documents. In comparison, sec-
tion 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) of the Rhode Island General Laws defines a
much broader class of documents, exempting "[aill records which
are identifiable to an individual applicant for benefits, client, pa-
tient, student, or employee." 19° Accordingly, any balancing test
must apply literally to any document maintained by the govern-
ment that is identifiable to an "applicant for benefits, client, pa-
tient, student, or employee." 19' The non-exclusive text of the
identifiable records exemption provides some insight concerning
the reach of a balancing test, which includes records relating to
medical treatment, welfare, employment security, students, all
personal or medical information, psychological facts, personal fi-
nances, attorneys/clients, and doctors/patients. 92
Furthermore, those advocating some sort of balancing test
must be forewarned that an undefined subjective test will have
ramifications. 93 It is easy to envision a scenario where a request-
ing party performs a balancing test to conclude that the public's
sonal right to privacy outweighs the public interest in access to those records or
the records are otherwise exempted from disclosure by statute").
188. Compare R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) (1997 & Supp. 2002) (exempt-
ing "[a]ll records which are identifiable to an individual applicant for benefits, cli-
ent, patient, student, or employee"), with 5 U.S.C § 552(b)(6) (1996) (exempting
"personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would consti-
tute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy").
189. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
190. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I).
191. Id.
192. See id.
193. See generally H. 5950, 1999 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. § 38-2-2(7) (R.I. 1999)
(defining "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" to include disclosing employ-
ment, medical, credit histories, or personal references of applicants for employ-
ment; revealing medical or personal records of a client or patient in a health care
or human service provider; selling or releasing names and addresses for commer-
cial or fundraising purposes; disclosing information of a personal nature reported
in confidence to an agency and not relevant to the ordinary work of an agency; and
disclosing medical information of a person with a disability that is either required
to be provided or the result of a person with a disability filing a discrimination
complaint).
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interest in disclosure outweighs an employee's privacy interest,
while on the other side of the equation, the governmental entity
performs the same test only to arrive at a contrary result. The dif-
fering conclusions will undoubtedly lead to an influx of complaints
and litigation alleging wrongful denial.
Understandably, judges have expressed concern when faced
with the prospect of ad hoc balancing tests.194 In one case involv-
ing the balancing of interests, a United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia concurring opinion noted that
"the judiciary is ill-equipped to make value-laden judgment calls
such as assessing the extent of the 'public interest.'"'195 On certio-
rari, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the major-
ity's concern about "assigning federal judges the task of striking a
proper case-by-case, or ad hoc [I balance," and observed that its
own cases "provide support for the proposition that categorical de-
cisions may be appropriate . . . when a case fits into a genus in
which the balance characteristically tips in one direction."' 96
Rather than amending the APRA to include a far-reaching bal-
ancing test that even proponents acknowledge will lead to unfore-
seen results, 97 the APRA should identify those records, consistent
with the APRA's central purpose, that the General Assembly
wishes to make public. The framework for such a proposal already
exists within section 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) where fourteen categories of
194. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 527 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting the "inherently nondeterminative nature of a
case-by-case balancing 'test' unaccompanied by any categorical rules, and the con-
sequent likelihood that individual judicial preferences will govern application of
the test"); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that in the area of the First Amendment "fairly precise rules are better
than more discretionary and more subjective balancing tests"); Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[The use of... traditional legal categories is
preferable to the sort of ad hoc balancing [tests]."); see also Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1175, 1187 (1989) ("For my sins,
I will probably write some . . . opinions that use [balancing tests], [a]ll I urge is
that th[else modes of analysis be avoided where possible.").
195. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. United States Dep't of Jus-
tice, 816 F.2d 730, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring in the judgment and
concurring in part), rev'd, 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
196. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 776.
197. See Landis, Progress on Records Law, supra note 171, at A15
("[Slupporters could not explain how the balancing test would work in Rhode
Island.").
20031 AN APPLICATION GONE AWRY 343
employee records are deemed public.' 98 This list could easily be
amended to include additional employee-related documents.
Nonetheless, if a balancing test is to be included within section
38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I), the identifiable records exemption must be
amended to narrow the class of documents affected.199 Documents
related to the attorney/client relationship, the doctor/patient rela-
tionship, medical treatment, personal finances, and students are
some examples of records that should not trigger a balancing of
interests. To accomplish this bifurcation, section 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I)
could set forth two exemptions. The first exemption would apply to
records identifiable to individual employees, but only if the em-
ployee's privacy interests outweighs the public's interest in disclo-
sure.20 0 The second exemption would apply to all records
identifiable to non-employees and would not contain a balancing
test. This bifurcation would recognize situations where the public
interest in disclosing certain employee records may outweigh an
employee's privacy interests, yet still protect the heightened pri-
198. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) (West 2003) ("With respect to em-
ployees, the name, gross salary, salary range, total cost of paid fringe benefits,
gross amount received in overtime, and other remuneration in addition to salary,
job title, job description, dates of employment, and positions held with the state or
municipality, work location, business telephone number, the city or town of resi-
dence, and date of termination shall be public.").
199. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 29-19-105(b)(12) (Michie 2002) (exempting
"[plersonnel records to the extent that disclosure would constitute clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy"); CAL. GOVT CODE § 6254(c) (West 1995) (ex-
empting "Iplersonnel, medical, or similar files, the disclosure of which would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-210(b)(2) (West 2000) (exempting "[plersonnel or medical files and similar files
the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of personal privacy"); DEL.
CODE. ANN. tit. 29, § 1002(d)(1) (1997) (exempting "[a]ny personnel, medical or pu-
pil file, the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of personal privacy");
IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-4(b)(8) (West 2002) (exempting "[plersonnel files of public
employees and files of applicants for public employment, except for the name, com-
pensation, job title, business address, business telephone number, job description,
education and training background, previous work experience, or dates of first and
last employment of present or former officers or employees of the agency; informa-
tion relating to the status of any formal charges against the employee; and infor-
mation concerning disciplinary actions in which final action has been taken and
that resulted in the employee being disciplined or discharged").
200. Subjecting employee records to a balancing test does not prohibit the Gen-
eral Assembly from delineating employee records that are categorically exempt
from public disclosure. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. STATE GOVT § 10-616(d) (1999) ("A
custodian shall deny inspection of a letter of reference.").
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vacy interests of other individuals whose information may be con-
tained within government documents.
B. Exemptions and Other Procedural Amendments
Since its enactment in 1979, the APRA has been amended six-
teen times. 20 1 Despite the almost constant attention legislators
201. See 2000 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 430 § 1 (adding that records required to be
maintained may not be substituted by a "real-time" translation reporter); 1999 R.I.
Pub. Laws ch. 130 § 85 (amending section 38-2-2(4)(i)(V) of the Rhode Island Gen-
eral Laws to substitute "TELE - TEXT" devices for "telecommunication" devices);
1999 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 83 § 85 (amending section 38-2-2(4)(i)(V) of the Rhode Is-
land General Laws to substitute "TELE - TEXT" devices for "telecommunication"
devices); 1998 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 378 § 1 (amending the purpose section; requiring
access to electronic records; altering language in four exemptions, among which
included mandating that reports reflecting the initial arrest of an adult be public;
increasing the first thirty minutes to the first hour of search and retrieval at no
charge; allowing attorney's fees, costs, and production of documents at no cost to a
prevailing plaintiff; and amending section 38-2-14 of the Rhode Island General
Laws to provide that settlement agreements of any legal claims against a govern-
mental entity are public records); 1997 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 326 § 168 (non-substan-
tive change to section 38-2-3(f) of the Rhode Island General Laws); 1995 R.I. Pub.
Laws ch. 112 § 1 (adding section 38-2-2(4)(i)(W) of the Rhode Island General Laws
to exempt from disclosure all records received by the Insurance Division of the
Department of Business Regulation from other states if such records are accorded
confidential treatment in that state); 1991 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 263 § 1 (providing
that a person shall have the right to review the test results of their own examina-
tion, increasing the first ten minutes to the first thirty minutes of search and re-
trieval at no charge, and adding section 38-2-14 of the Rhode Island General Laws
to provide that records reflecting the financial settlement of any legal claims
against a governmental entity are public records); 1991 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 208 § 1
(amending section 38-2-2(4)(i)(A)(I) of the Rhode Island General Laws to delineate
fourteen categories of employee records deemed public, providing that pension
records shall be deemed public, requiring the law enforcement records to fall
within one of six categories to be exempt from disclosure, and mandating that
records relating to the management and direction of a law enforcement agency
shall be public); 1988 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 87 § 1 (imposing a $1,000 fine for a willful
violation); 1986 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 345 § 1 (including section 38-2-13 of the Rhode
Island General Laws to provide that records initially deemed public records shall
continue to be deemed public records whether or not subsequent court action or
investigations pertain to the records); 1986 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 203 § 1 (adding sec-
tion 38-2-2(4)(i)(V) of the Rhode Island General Laws to exempt printouts from
telecommunication devices for the deaf or hearing and speech impaired); 1984 R.I.
Pub. Laws ch. 372 § 2 (amending section 38-2-2(4)(i)(J) of the Rhode Island Gen-
eral Laws to exempt executive session minutes sealed pursuant to the Open Meet-
ings Act); 1982 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 416 § 1 (adding section 38-2-2(4)(i)(U) of the
Rhode Island General Laws to exempt library records revealing the identity of a
patron); 1981 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 353 § 1 (expanding the definitions of "public body"
and "public record," including definitions of "public business" and "supervisor of
the regulatory body," and adding section 38-2-2(4)(i)(T) of the Rhode Island Gen-
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have devoted to the APRA, portions of the present statute, as well
as failed amendments, sometimes contradict the APRA's central
purpose.
One such example involving the privacy of a surviving family
member concerned a proposed, albeit failed, amendment that
would have done little to reveal the government's decision-making
process. 20 2 In particular, during the 2002 legislative session iden-
tical House of Representatives and Senate bills were introduced
exempting "[alutopsy reports and death certificates relating to
open criminal investigations reports and certificates relating to
closed investigation are open records."20 3 Although not a model of
clarity, the proposed amendment would certainly have made death
certificates relating to closed criminal investigations a public re-
cord. 204 More troubling is that since the proposed amendment ex-
pressly exempted only "[alutopsy reports and death certificates
relating to open criminal investigations," the amendment could
easily be interpreted to require that autopsy reports pertaining to
eral Laws to exempt from disclosure records of judicial bodies unless in its admin-
istrative function); 1981 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 279 § 2 (providing that a complaint
may be filed with the Department of Attorney General and that the Department of
Attorney General may initiate injunctive or declaratory proceedings on the com-
plainant's behalf); 1980 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 269 § 1 (amending section 38-2-
2(4)(i)(C) of the Rhode Island General Laws to exempt from disclosure records of
juvenile proceedings before the family court and amending section 38-2-2(4)(i)(D)
of the Rhode Island General Laws to require disclosure of initial arrest records of
"an adult," rather than "a person").
202. Although "the right to privacy dies with the person," Rhode Island law
appears to recognize that a right to privacy in the memory of the deceased extends
to the surviving family members. Clift v. Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d
805, 814-15 (R.I. 1996) ("[The reporter's conversation with the decedent did not,
however, rise to the level of an actionable intrusion into the Clit family's seclu-
sion."); see also Favish v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 217 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir.
2000) ("The personal privacy in [the FOIA] extends to the memory of the deceased
held by those tied closely to the deceased by blood or love and, therefore, that the
expectable invasion of their privacy caused by the release of records made for law
enforcement must be balanced against the public purpose to be served by disclo-
sure."); Katz v. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., 862 F. Supp. 476, 485 (D.D.C.
1994) (release of the photograph of President Kennedy's body held to invade the
privacy of members of the Kennedy family), affd on other grounds, 68 F.3d 1438
(D.C. Cir. 1995); New York Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1009-10 (D.C. Cir.
1990), remanded to 782 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1991) (on remand) (release of last
taped conversation with Challenger astronauts blocked because it would invade
the privacy of their families).
203. See H. 6956, 2002 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. § 38-2-2.1(g) (R.I. 2002); S.
2549, 2002 Gen. Assem., Jan, Sess. § 38-2-2.1(g) (R.I. 2002).
204. S. 2549, 2002 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. § 38-2-2.1(g) (R.I. 2002).
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closed criminal investigations - or, worse yet - autopsy reports and
death certificates unrelated to any criminal investigation, consti-
tute public records.
Another proposed amendment that could have disclosed non-
governmental records was introduced into the House of Represent-
atives in 1999 and 2000.205 The 1999 bill proposed to exempt:
The home address or the home telephone number of law en-
forcement, judicial, prosecutorial, department of children,
youth and families services, correctional, or any other public
safety or criminal justice system personnel, or victims of ad-
judicated crimes; health inspector, individuals providing fam-
ily planning services, or the name, home address, or
telephone number of any family member of any of the
foregoing. 20 6
Although this language exempted a small category of employ-
ees' home addresses and home telephone numbers, as well as the
home addresses and home telephone numbers of victims of adjudi-
cated crimes,20 7 the 1999 bill treated differently any other person,
including private citizens. With respect to all non-delineated indi-
viduals, the 1999 bill mandated that the home address and home
telephone number not be disclosed, but only upon demonstrating
that "disclosure would create an unreasonable risk of personal har-
205. See H. 7257, 2000 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. § 38-2-2.2 (R.I. 2000); H. 5483,
1999 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. § 38-2-2(4)(i)(x) (R.I. 1999).
206. H. 5483, 1999 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. § 38-2-2(4)(i)(x) (R.I. 1999). Not-
withstanding this exemption, House Bill 5483 also contained an identical provision
that the delineated home addresses and home telephone numbers "shall not [be]
discloseid]." Id. Subject to other statutory provisions mandating confidentiality,
documents that are exempt from public disclosure pursuant to the APRA may be
disclosed. See R.I. Fed'n of Teachers v. Sundlun, 595 A.2d 799, 803 (R.I. 1990)
("Our statute ... is directed solely toward requiring disclosure by public agencies
and does not provide a reverse remedy to prevent disclosure."). Accordingly, House
Bill 5483 contained conflicting language exempting, but permitting, the disclosure
of home addresses and home telephone numbers, while also containing language
prohibiting the disclosure of home addresses and home telephone numbers.
207. According to the proposed amendment, a crime victim's home address and
home telephone number may be excluded from the public purview only after the
crime has been adjudicated. This, of course, presumes that prior to adjudication,
the crime victim's home address and home telephone number constitute public
records. Notwithstanding the over-arching APRA issue concerning what public in-
terest is advanced by disclosing a crime victim's home address and home telephone
number, the exemption for home addresses and home telephone numbers of adju-
dicated crime victims is inconsequential since this information will have already
been in the public domain.
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assment or physical danger to the person or property of such indi-
viduals or their family members."208 The 2000 bill was similar.
20 9
Considering the APRA's central purpose, one must ponder how
the disclosure of a person's death certificate, autopsy report, home
address, or home telephone number advances the public's interest
in learning about the government's activities. These examples
would seem to be so obviously outside the APRA's central purpose
that enacting an exemption would be redundant. 210 Yet in recent
years, amendments have been introduced that, at best, were di-
rected to ensure confidentiality, but were poorly drafted, or, at
worst, were written in a manner to exempt a small portion of
records, but require the disclosure of the larger class.2 11
In contrast to proposed amendments that unduly infringe
upon a person's privacy, two present exemptions unduly hinder the
public's oversight function. For instance, among the broadest ex-
emption in any freedom of information law is section 38-2-
2(4)(i)(M) of the Rhode Island General Laws, which exempts from
public disclosure all "[ciorrespondence of or to elected officials with
or relating to those they represent and correspondence of or to
elected officials in their official capacities."212 Unlike other states
with similar, though narrower, exemptions, 213 the plain language
208. H. 5483, 1999 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. § 38-2-2(4)(i)(x) (R.I. 1999).
209. H. 7257, 2000 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. § 38-2-2.2(1) (R.I. 2000). The only
difference between the two proposed bills was that the 2000 bill added an addi-
tional category to prohibit the disclosure of the home address and home telephone
number of "individuals providing shelter services to victims of domestic violence."
Id.
210. See supra Part I.
211. But see infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
212. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(4)(i)(M) (1997 & Supp. 2002). A related issue con-
cerns obtaining documents from the General Assembly and the constitutional priv-
ileges enjoyed by the General Assembly that makes the APRA unenforceable
against that branch of government. For a detailed discussion, see James T.
O'Reilly, Applying Federal Open Government Laws to Congress: An Explorative
Analysis and Proposal, 31 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 415 (1994).
213. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(7) (Michie 1987) (exempting "corre-
spondence of the Governor, members of the General Assembly, Supreme Court
Justices, Court of Appeals Judges, and the Attorney General"); CAL. GOVT CODE
§ 6254(l) (West 1995) (exempting "[ciorrespondence of and to the Governor or em-
ployees of the Governor's office or in the custody of or maintained by the Gover-
nor's legal affairs secretary, provided that public records shall not be transferred to
the custody of the Governor's legal affairs secretary to evade the disclosure provi-
sions of this chapter"); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-72-202(11) (2001) (correspondence of
elected officials represent public records unless correspondence is work product,
without a demonstrable connection to the exercise required or authorized by law
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of section 38-2-2(4)(i)(M) expressly applies to any state or local
elected officer and encompasses all documents authored or re-
ceived by that individual. 214 While significant policy arguments
exist to facilitate correspondence to and from constituents, and to
promote open communication within an agency during the deliber-
ative processes, final decisions and other similar documents affect-
ing the public should most certainly be available for public
inspection.
In a similar vein, the exemption codified at section 38-2-
2(4)(i)(K) of the Rhode Island General Laws for "memoranda" is
broader than the other preliminary documents delineated in this
exemption.215 Specifically, section 38-2-2(4)(i)(K) also exempts
from public disclosure preliminary drafts, notes, impressions,
working papers, and work products; all documents that embrace
the deliberative process and that are incapable of memorializing
final action. However, an agency that wishes to conceal public pol-
icy or other final action could, in accordance with section 38-2-
2(4)(i)(K), simply memorialize this action in a memorandum.
Rather than identifying the form of specified documents, an
amended section 38-2-2(4)(i)(K) should exempt documents that re-
present the substance of the deliberation process. 21 6
and does not involve the receipt or expenditure of public funds, a communication
to/from a constituent that implies confidentially, or prohibited by law); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 45-221(14) (2000) (exempting "Iclorrespondence between a public agency
and a private individual, other than correspondence which is intended to give no-
tice of an action, policy or determination relating to any regulatory, supervisory or
enforcement responsibility of the public agency or which is widely distributed to
the public by a public agency and is not specifically in response to communications
from such a private individual"); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.878(1)(h) (Michie 1993)
(exempting "correspondence with private individuals, other than correspondence
which is intended to give notice of final action of a public agency"); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63-2-304(29) (1997) (exempting "records of the governor's office, including
budget recommendations, legislative proposals, and policy statements, that if dis-
closed would reveal the governor's contemplated policies or contemplated courses
of action before the governor has implemented or rejected those policies or courses
of action or made them public").
214. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-2-2(4)(i)(M) (1997 & Supp. 2002) (exempting
"[clorrespondence of or to elected officials with or relating to those they represent
and correspondence of or to elected officials in their official capacities").
215. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(4)(i)(K) (1997 & Supp. 2002).
216. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.878(1)(i) (Michie 1993) (exempting "prelimi-
nary recommendations, and preliminary memoranda in which opinions are ex-
pressed or policies formulated or recommended").
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Future amendments must also address the post-September 11
realities that disclosing blueprints, water treatment plans, secur-
ity procedures, and other similar documents can threaten public
safety. As presently enacted, the APRA only exempts "[sIcientific
and technological secrets and the security plans of military and
law enforcement agencies, the disclosure of which would endanger
the public welfare and security."217 In 2002, a proposed bill, which
subsequently failed, attempted to remedy some of these security
concerns by exempting "plans, assessments or security measures
relating to publicly-owned or operated biological, nuclear, incendi-
ary, chemical or explosive ('BNICE') facilities."218 An amendment
must consider a broader application to protect public safety with-
out unduly hindering the public interest.219
Lastly, the APRA should be amended to allow, in rare circum-
stances, an agency to seek an extension of the maximum thirty
business day timeframe within which to respond to a public
records request.220 Absent an amendment, voluminous re-
quests 221 or simply dire circumstances 2 22 can divert an agency's
limited resources without considering society's overall best inter-
ests. In these situations, a public body could seek leave of court
and would have the burden to demonstrate that, even with the ex-
ercise of due diligence, exceptional circumstances require a court-
approved extension. A court could consider the volume of the re-
217. R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-2-2(4)(i)(F) (West 2003).
218. H. 7449, 2002 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. § 38-2-2(4)(i)(F)(II) (R.I. 2002).
219. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-221(a)(12) (2000) (exempting "[riecords of
emergency or security information or procedures of a public agency, or plans,
drawings, specifications or related information for any building or facility which is
used for purposes requiring security measures in or around the building or facility
or which is used for the generation or transmission of power, water, fuels or com-
munication, if disclosure would jeopardize security of the public agency, building
or facility"); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.501(18) (West 2003) (exempting "[s]pecific opera-
tional plans in connection with an anticipated threat to individual or public safety
for deployment and use of personnel and equipment, prepared and used by a law
enforcement agency, if public disclosure thereof would endanger the life or physi-
cal safety of a citizen or law enforcement officer or jeopardize the law enforcement
activity involved").
220. See supra note 170.
221. See supra notes 160 and 165.
222. See, e.g., Tracy Breton & Zachary Mider, The Station Nightclub Disaster -
Town Hall Seen Releasing Night Club Records Next Week, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 1,
2003, at A7 (estimating seventeen or eighteen APRA requests to the Town of West
Warwick after the February 20, 2003 nightclub fire), available at 2003 WL
7057261.
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quested records, the agency's due diligence in attempting to com-
ply within the APRA's timeframe, the agency's resources, and
other relevant factors. Such an amendment could be modeled after
the FOIA.223
CONCLUSION
Promulgated in 1979, and amended on many occasions, the
General Assembly has charged the APRA with a difficult task -
delineating standards to determine whether a document main-
tained by any local or state agency is a public record. Although
some may describe our freedom of information law as "complex,"224
the reality is that no statute can anticipate the form and content of
every document maintained by all governmental entities. 225
Since the APRA will undoubtedly continue to govern the pub-
lic dissemination of government documents in Rhode Island, it is
vital to consider the question posed in the introduction: How open
should Rhode Island government be?2 26 The answer lies in fulfil-
ling the APRA's central purpose that citizens be permitted to ac-
cess documents concerning government operations and final
agency decisions, but that documents unrelated to government ac-
tivity, fall outside the ambit of the APRA. 2 27 As interpreted by our
judiciary, two guiding principles for considering APRA matters al-
ready exist.
The first established principle mandates that "records that do
not specifically identify individuals and that represent final ac-
tions" must be disclosed. 228 The second principle expressly refer-
ences the United States Supreme Court's FOIA interpretations
and observes:
The FOIA was designed to create a broad right of access to
"official information." Whether disclosure of a private docu-
ment is warranted must turn on the nature of the requested
223. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i) (2000) ("If the Government can show excep-
tional circumstances exist and that the agency is exercising due diligence in re-
sponding to the request, the court may retain jurisdiction and allow the agency
additional time to complete its review of the records.").
224. See Liz Anderson, State's Complex Public-Records Law Under Scrutiny,
PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 24, 2003, at B1, available at 2003 WL 7056509.
225. See supra note 180.
226. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
227. See supra Part I.
228. Direct Action for Rights & Equal. v. Gannon, 713 A.2d 218, 224 (R.I. 1998).
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document and its relationship to the basic purpose of the
Freedom of Information Act to open agency action to the light
of public scrutiny rather than on the particular purpose for
which the document is being requested. Official information
that sheds light on an agency's performance of statutory du-
ties falls squarely within that statutory purpose. That pur-
pose, however, is not fostered by disclosure of information
about private citizens that is accumulated in various govern-
mental files but that reveals little or nothing about an
agency's own conduct. 22 9
As future amendments are contemplated by the General As-
sembly, these two guiding principles should be heeded. Our legis-
lators must be cognizant of the fact that although the APRA has
the noblest of purposes, unintended uses and consequences do oc-
cur that dilute the APRA's central purpose and that cast the appli-
cation of the law awry. 230 With these principles in mind, Rhode
229. Providence Journal Co. v. Pine, C.A. No. 96-6274, 1997 WL 356904, at *4
(R.I. Super. Ct. June 24, 1998).
230. See Arruda v. Law Revision Office, 2001 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 01-04 (July
10, 2001) (unofficial opinion) (requesting copies of public laws in April 2000 from
the Law Revision Office, and on May 11, 2000 receiving copies of public laws from
the Office of the Secretary of State; but nonetheless filing a petition for review with
the Speaker of the House on May 22, 2000, and a complaint with the Department
of Attorney General against the Law Revision Office and the Speaker of the House
in June 2000), available at http://www.riag.state.ri.us/opinion/docs/advpr0l-04.
htm; Blais v. Revens, 2001 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 01-01 (May 18, 2001) (unofficial
opinion) (after the Department of Attorney General entered its appearance in an
APRA case pending in superior court, complainant, who was opposing counsel in
the superior court case, filed APRA complaint with the Department of Attorney
General concerning the same subject-matter as already pending in the superior
court in an attempt to create conflict of interest), available at http://www.riag.
state.ri.us/access/docs/prOl-01.htm. Cf Central Falls City Council v. City of Cen-
tral Falls, 2001 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 01-05 (Aug. 7, 2001) (unofficial opinion)
(City Council filing APRA complaint against Mayor), available at http://www.riag.
state.ri.us/meetings/docs/2001/omOl-05.htm, and Matthews v. Central Falls City
Council, 2001 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. OM 01-04 (Aug. 7, 2001) (unofficial opinion)
(Mayor filing Open Meeting Act complaint against City Council), available at http:/
/www.riag.state.ri.us/meetings/docs/2001/omOl-04.htm; cf. also Dietz v. R.I. Bd. of
Registration for Profl Land Surveyors, 2000 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 00-27 (Dec. 15,
2000) (unofficial opinion) (alleging inaccurate transcript and inadequate audio
equipment to review audiotape), available at http://www.riag.state.ri.us/access/
2000upr.html; Dietz v. R.I. Bd. of Registration for Profl Land Surveyors, 2000 Op.
R.I. Att'y Gen. OM 00-29 (Dec. 15, 2000) (unofficial opinion) (open meeting com-
plaint filed alleging illegal closed meeting after Board forwarded application for
new license, rather than application for renewal, and affirmed its determination
that complainant's license had lapsed), available at http://www.riag.state.ri.us/
meetings/docs/2000/om29-00.html; Dietz v. R.I. Bd. of Registration for Prof'l Land
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Island citizens can ensure that the operation and function of their
government remains open and accountable.
Surveyors, 1999 Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. OM 99-25 (Nov. 19, 1999) (unofficial opinion)
(open meeting complaint alleging Board failed to file minutes with the Office of
Secretary of State), available at http://www.riag.state.ri.us/meetingsdocs/1999/
om99-25.html; Dietz v. R.I. Bd. of Registration for Profl Land Surveyors, 1999 Op.
R.I. Att'y Gen. PR 99-17 (Nov. 19, 1999) (unofficial opinion) (public record com-
plaint alleging improper denial), available at http://www.riag.state.ri.us/access/
docs/pr99-17.html; Dietz v. R.I. Bd. of Registration for Profl Land Surveyors, 2000
Op. R.I. Att'y Gen. OM 00-12 (May 12, 2000) (unofficial opinion) (open meeting
complaint alleging Board failed to file minutes with the Office of Secretary of
State), available at http://www.riag.state.ri.us/meetings/docs/2000/omOO-12.html.
